Massive oil spill begins in Gulf of Mexico

Massive oil spill begins in Gulf of Mexico

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April 20, 2010: An explosion and fire aboard the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 50 miles off the Louisiana coast, kills 11 people and triggers the largest offshore oil spill in American history. The rig had been in the final phases of drilling an exploratory well for BP, the British oil giant. By the time the well was capped three months later, an estimated 4.9 million barrels (or around 206 million gallons) of crude oil had poured into the Gulf.

The disaster began when a surge of natural gas from the well shot up a riser pipe to the rig’s platform, where it set off a series of explosions and a massive blaze. Of the 126 people on board the nearly 400-foot-long Deepwater Horizon, 11 workers perished and 17 others were seriously injured. The fire burned for more than a day before the Deepwater Horizon, constructed for $350 million in 2001, sank on April 22 in some 5,000 feet of water.

Before evacuating the Deepwater Horizon, crew members tried unsuccessfully to activate a safety device called a blowout preventer, which was designed to shut off the flow of oil from the well in an emergency. Over the next three months, a variety of techniques were tried in an effort to plug the hemorrhaging well, which was spewing thousands of barrels of oil into the Gulf each day. Finally, on July 15, BP announced the well had been temporarily capped, and on September 19, after cement was injected into the well to permanently seal it, the federal government declared the well dead. By that point, however, oil from the spill had reached coastal areas of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, where it would inflict a heavy toll on the region’s economy, particularly the fishing and tourism industries, and wildlife. Scientists say the full extent of the environmental damage could take decades to assess.

In January 2011, a national investigative commission released a report concluding the Deepwater Horizon disaster was “foreseeable and preventable” and the result of “human error, engineering mistakes and management failures,” along with ineffective government regulation. In November 2012, BP agreed to plead guilty to 14 criminal charges brought against it by the U.S. Justice Department, and pay $4.5 billion in fines. Additionally, the Justice Department charged two BP managers who supervised testing on the well with manslaughter, and another company executive with making false statements about the size of the spill. In July 2015, BP agreed to pay $18.7 billion in fines.

As Gulf spill spreads, blame game begins

When BP looks at the spreading oil slick in the Gulf of Mexico that now threatens flora, fauna and livelihoods along the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, it's really seeing money floating away on the tide.

That's why it may be trying to shift some of the blame for the massive undersea leak to Transocean, which was running the rig that exploded on April 20 and eventually sank, leaving one of the worst oil spills in history in its wake.

"It wasn't our accident, but we are absolutely responsible for the oil, for cleaning it up, and that's what we intend to do," BP Group CEO Tony Hayward told NBC's "TODAY" show.

"What has failed here is the ultimate safety device on a drilling rig," he said. "There are many barriers of protection that you have to go to before you get to this. It isn't designed to not fail."

Guy Cantwell, a Transocean spokesman, responded by reading a statement without elaborating. "We will await all the facts before drawing conclusions and we will not speculate," he said.

It's too early to tell the final costs for BP. The oil is still flowing from the well's three leaks and it is still heading for shore. Where it hits and how much damage it does will factor into the price tag.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is pressing BP for specifics on how it will pay for the cleanup. Hayward is heading to Washington Monday to discuss that with Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar.

The British oil giant said Monday it will pay the expected multibillion-dollar cleanup cost and issued assurances that it will pay any reasonable claim for damages caused by the spill.

"BP takes responsibility for responding to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,” the company said in a statement. “We will clean it up."

That clean-up process could take years. In the meantime, the local economy is already bracing for a major financial hit as the spill bears down on one of the world’s richest fishing grounds, the source of nearly a third of all seafood consumed in the U.S. Louisiana officials say that industry brings in some $3 billion a year.

The full financial impact on BP depends on several factors that won’t be known for some time. The biggest wildcard is the eventual size of the spill. BP is already spending about $6 million a day as it scrambles to contain the damage, but technology being employed to contain the flow of oil has not been used in waters as deep as the site of the leaking well.

“As I understand, they have 1,000 people working round the clock, trying to get something organized in such a way, engineered in such a way that it's reliable and has integrity,” said John Hofmeister, former CEO of U.S. operations at Shell Oil who now heads Citizens for Affordable Energy. “There's no stone left being unturned here that I can tell.”

Those efforts include the deployment of a 40-foot steel structure to collect the leaking oil before it reaches the surface, an untested method of capturing oil flowing from a series of leaks along the platform wreckage on the seabed. BP is also using underwater robots to spray chemical dispersants to try to prevent the oil from reaching the surface. The success of those efforts could help contain the ultimate damage and cost of clean-up.

So far, it’s impossible to estimate the total price tag. Analysts at Merrill Lynch figure that a clean-up operation lasting six months could cost around $3 billion.

Though BP is liable for the entire clean-up cost, it’s exposure to damage claims is capped at $75 million by an oil trust fund administered by the government. That fund, paid for by taxes on the oil industry, could pay up to $1 billion in claims.

Local fishermen are already bracing for the worst from the spill.

“Who can survive two months of this?” said John Tesvich, an oyster grower in Plaquemines Parish. “It's devastating by any measure. It's a catastrophe and it's still out there. We're just beginning to see the effects.”

Dozens of lawsuits have already been filed by commercial fishermen, charter boat operators and beachfront property owners from Texas to Florida.

The ultimate environmental damage could depend on the impact of wind and weather on the direction of the spill, already estimated to be as large as Puerto Rico. Scientists say the scope of the disaster also makes it difficult to estimate just how badly the already fragile ecosystem will be harmed over the long term

“As this area has lost wetlands over the last 100 years, it's lost almost 2,000 square miles worth of wetlands,” said Alexander Kolker, a coastal geologist and professor of coastal and wetlands science at Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium. “It's lost a lot of the productivity and it's lost a lot of the habitat that would allow these bird populations and other populations to recover.”

Some of the costs likely are to be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices as the spill takes its toll on the seafood hauls from the Gulf. Federal officials shut down fishing for at least 10 days from the Mississippi River to the Florida Panhandle on Sunday because of the uncontrolled gusher spewing massive amounts of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.

It also remains to be seen how liability could be shared between BP, Transocean or Halliburton, which also has been named as a defendant in lawsuits because it had cemented the well's pipes about two days before the rig exploded. (Halliburton says it's too soon to say what caused the spill.) Who's to blame won’t be known until the cause of the accident — and the failure of a critical shutoff valve — has been determined.

“Transocean does have insurance to cover the cost of the rig and other types of insurance including liability that should help cover them,” said Philip Weiss, senior energy analyst at Argus Research. “We don't know yet what the fault was and if that could change the equation.”

On Monday, two congressmen asked officials from BP, Transocean and Halliburton to testify on the causes of the explosion and the failure of the valve designed to seal off the well.

The legal battle over damage claims could take years to resolve. After Exxon paid roughly $4 billion in damages resulting from the 1989 Valdez spill in Alaska, a jury in 1994 assessed $5 billion in punitive damages. In June, 2008, the Supreme Court reduced that amount to $500 million.

If the spill can be contained soon, BP is in relatively good shape to weather the financial hit from the cost of the clean-up.

Last week, the company reported that rising oil prices sent first-quarter net profits soaring to $6 billion — more than double last year’s levels. As of the end of the quarter, the company had more than $12 billion in cash on its balance sheet.

BP shareholders, meanwhile, have already lost more than $175 million, after the company’s stock plunged on the news of the rig explosion and uncontrolled spill. Analysts say the long-term impact on the stock price, and the company’s reputation, will depend heavily on how well it responds to the clean-up and damage claims.

BP oil spill cleanup toxic to key species

Using oil-dispersing chemicals during the massive 2010 spill in the Gulf of Mexico likely did far more damage than good to a crucial aquatic animal, according to new research that wades into the hotly contested question of whether and when to use the chemicals following an oil spill.

The dispersant used by oil company BP, when mixed with crude oil, was found to be 52 times more toxic than oil alone to some microscopic plankton-like organisms called rotifers.

About 6.8 million litres of the chemical – called Corexit 9500A — were released into the Gulf of Mexico to try to mitigate the devastating underwater petroleum leak caused by the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil rig on April 20, 2010.

At the time, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other government bodies agonized over whether to use dispersants and, if so, which ones and how much.

Dispersants cause giant pools of spilled oil floating atop the sea to break up into tiny droplets that then dilute with water just below the surface. The process helps creatures including turtles, birds and mammals that need access to the surface, and also ensures less oil flows ashore where it can choke coastal wildlife. However, it increases the amount of oil just below the surface, potentially contaminating the organisms that live there.

Scientists at the Autonomous University of Aguascalientes in Mexico and the Georgia Institute of Technology now say Corexit 9500A is far more harmful than previously thought to a key dweller of those sub-surface depths.

They studied the effect of oil, of Corexit 9500A, and of various mixtures of both on five species of rotifer from the genus brachionus. The rotifers are a core element at the base of the Gulf Coast food chain, where they're eaten by crabs, shrimp and small fish.

The research, released online Friday ahead of its publication in the February 2013 issue of the scientific journal Environmental Pollution, found that on their own, the oil and dispersant were equally toxic. But when combined, the oil and dispersant increased toxicity to one of the rotifer species by a factor of 52.

"What remains to be determined is whether the benefits of dispersing the oil by using Corexit are outweighed by the substantial increase in toxicity of the mixture," said study co-author Terry Snell, chair of Georgia Tech's biology school. "Perhaps we should allow the oil to naturally disperse. It might take longer, but it would have less toxic impact on marine ecosystems."

EPA tested on shrimp and fish

The research paper looked at rotifers because they're a common litmus test in ecological studies of toxicity, due to their sensitivity and quick reactions to contaminants.

Previous studies on oil-spill dispersants, particularly ones done by the Environmental Protection Agency while the BP well was still leaking, looked at other organisms. The EPA's tests were based on shrimp and a small fish that lives in estuaries called a silverside, and they found that nearly all dispersants, when mixed with oil, were no more toxic than the oil alone.

That may have led the agency to permit more dispersant to be used than it would otherwise have allowed.

"Our study indicates the increase in toxicity may have been greatly underestimated following the … well explosion," said Roberto-Rico Martinez of the Mexican university, the rotifer study's lead author.

The issue has been hotly debated in the United States ever since the Deepwater Horizon exploded. The Senate's environment and appropriations committees both held hearings on the use of dispersants in summer 2010, and several environmental groups have sued the EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard over the regulation and use of the chemicals.

The new study emerged as three BP managers were in court this week for arraignment on criminal charges related to the disaster. A fourth worker, a former BP engineer, also faces charges.


"It is of grave concern," David Kennedy of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration said. "I am frightened. This is a very, very big thing. And the efforts that are going to be required to do anything about it, especially if it continues on, are just mind-boggling."

The oil slick could become the worst U.S. environmental disaster in decades, threatening hundreds of species of fish, birds and other wildlife along the Gulf Coast, one of the world's richest seafood grounds, teeming with shrimp, oysters and other marine life.

The U.S. Coast Guard was working with BP, the company that operated the oil rig that exploded and sank last week, to deploy floating booms, skimmers and chemical dispersants on the water, and to set controlled fires to burn the oil off the sea's surface.

BP said it is considering using a chemical to break up the oil underwater, a technique that has never been tried before at these depths. The leaking wellhead is 1,500 metres below the water's surface.

Jindal's declaration of a state of emergency paves the way for federal intervention and assistance, including additional booms from the coast guard that will help protect coasts and fisheries.

Obama says BP will pay

U.S. President Barack Obama said earlier his administration will use "every single available resource at our disposal" to deal with the spill. Obama said that could include using the military in the response.

The president said BP, which was operating the Deepwater Horizon oil rig when it exploded and sank last week triggering the leak, will ultimately carry the cost of the cleanup.

U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar and the Environmental Protection Agency's administrator, Lisa Jackson, will travel to the Gulf Coast on Friday to look at cleanup operations.

Napolitano declared Thursday the spill was "of national significance."

"This means we can draw down assets from across the country" and centralize communications, Napolitano said, making a rare appearance at a White House news briefing Thursday afternoon.

"We are being very aggressive and we are prepared for the worst case," coast guard Rear Adm. Sally Brice-O'Hara said at the White House.

Federal officials announced inspections would begin immediately of all oil rigs in the Gulf and subpoena powers would be used in the gathering investigation. But the priority was to support BP to fight the oil surging from the seabed.

Spill more massive than thought

BP officials acknowledged Thursday morning that the spill may be five times larger than originally believed.

The leak began after the deepwater rig operated by BP exploded and burned on April 20.

Early estimates said 1,000 barrels a day were leaking from the drilling site of the coast of Louisiana.

But on Wednesday, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration revised that to 5,000 barrels, a number BP's chief operating officer, Doug Suttles denied vehemently at a news conference late Wednesday night.

By Thursday morning, Suttles had reversed his stance.

"We can now say it's probably more than 1,000," Suttles told Matt Lauer on NBC's Today. "It's within the range. I would say the range is from one to 5,000 barrels a day.

"That 1,000 barrels a day … was the best estimate at the time."

Fishing industry mobilized

BP has not said if or when it can stop the leak and keep the rest of the oil from washing up onshore.

"We continue to focus on ensuring that [the oil] doesn't [reach the coast]," BP CEO Tony Hayward told CNN on Wednesday.

"I can tell you we'll do everything, absolutely everything to [stop the leak] as soon as possible," Suttles said Thursday.

"We'll take help from anyone."

The spill has put Louisiana's seafood industry on high alert. With $1.8 billion in sales annually, it is the largest industry of its kind in the lower 48 states.

"We're all concerned," Harlon Pierce, the chair of the Louisiana Seafood Promotion and Marketing Board, told CBC News from New Orleans. "If it was a 10-gallon spill we would be equally concerned and equally as motivated to solve the problem.

"One-third of the growing area for seafood in the entire United States is off the coast of Louisiana. So protection of this area to me is … as important or more important than anything else."

Time of the essence

Pierce said fishing fleets have been mobilized to help the cleanup effort.

BP crews on Wednesday conducted a controlled burn on parts of the oil spill — a technique designed to remove large amounts of oil from open water.

As of Wednesday, it had also deployed 16 large skimming vessels to remove oil from the water's surface and 288,000 litres of dispersants, BP said on its website, and had recovered 16,311 barrels of oil-water mix.

BP was to set more fires after the test, but as night fell, there were no more burns.

Crews planned to use hand-held flares to set fire to sections of the spill. They turned to the idea after failing to stop the leak at the spot where the oil drilling platform exploded on April 20 and later sank.

Eleven workers are missing and presumed dead and more than 100 escaped the blast, the cause of which has not been determined.

A Deepwater Horizon timeline

A timeline of the massive 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, government response and ensuing legal cases up to Feb. 25. Click the Close button below to condense the list click individual boxes to open or close them.

  • The rig catches fire
  • April 20, 2010
  • Obama's first statement
  • April 29, 2010
  • Hayward is optimistic
  • May 14, 2010
  • Then-BP CEO Tony Hayward says the amount of spilled oil is relatively small given the size of the Gulf. "The Gulf of Mexico is a very big ocean," he says. "The amount of volume of oil and dispersant we are putting into it is tiny in relation to the total water volume."
  • First try: The 'top kill'
  • May 28, 2010
  • CEO offends residents
  • May 30, 2010
  • $20 billion fund begins
  • June 16, 2010
  • BP agrees to put $20 billion into an escrow fund to settle economic injury claims by fishermen and various Gulf industries.
  • Drilling ban overturned
  • June 22, 2010
  • A federal judge strikes down the Obama administration's six-month ban on deepwater drilling in the Gulf, saying the government rashly concluded that other rigs could be in immediate danger.
  • Latest estimate a record
  • July 1, 2010
  • Cap fits into place
  • July 15, 2010
  • After 85 days, BP manages to stanch the leak with a massive cap. The cap holds until a more permanent solution is put into place.
  • Hayward to step down
  • July 26, 2010
  • BP says Hayward, who is British, will step down on Oct. 1 and be succeeded by American Robert Dudley. BP said it planned to recommend Hayward for a non-executive board position at its joint venture in Russia.
  • Seal in place
  • September 19, 2010
  • Tougher rules
  • October 12, 2010
  • Lawsuits begin
  • December 15, 2010
  • The Justice Department files suit against BP and eight other companies over the accident, asking they be held liable for removal costs and damages caused by the explosion and spill.
  • Critical report
  • January 12, 2011
  • A 380-page report from government-appointed National Oil Spill Commission finds that time- and money-saving decisions created an unreasonable amount of risk that triggered the Deepwater Horizon explosion.
  • 1st settlement
  • March 2, 2012
  • BP and lawyers for residents and businesses that said they were hurt by the spill reach a settlement before the trial begins. Tens of thousands of people waiting for money from a fund managed by Kenneth Feinberg, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, can take what the settlement offers them or opt out and make a claim directly to a BP-run entity. They can file suit if they don't like what they get from that fund.
  • Criminal penalty set
  • November 15, 2012
  • BP agrees to pay $4.5 billion in a settlement with the U.S. government and to plead guilty to felony counts related to the deaths of 11 workers and lying to Congress. The figure includes nearly $1.3 billion in criminal fines — the largest such penalty ever — along with payments to several government entities. Two BP well site leaders are charged with manslaughter, and a former executive is charged with lying to authorities.
  • Transocean settles
  • Jan. 3, 2013
  • The Justice Department reaches a $1.4 billion settlement with rig owner Transocean Ltd. The deal requires the Switzerland-based company to pay $1 billion in civil penalties and $400 million in criminal penalties and plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge of violating the Clean Water Act.
  • Judge gives OK
  • Jan. 29, 2013
  • A federal judge approves the settlement between the U.S. government and BP.
  • Transocean deal OK'd
  • Feb. 14, 2013
  • A federal judge approves Transocean Ltd.'s agreement with the Justice Department.
  • Civil battle begins
  • Feb. 25, 2013
  • Opening statements begin in a high-stakes trial to determine the cause of the well blowout that led to the spill and assign percentages of blame to BP and other companies involved. Billions of dollars are at stake.

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Timeline of the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill

Oil is no longer spewing into the Gulf of Mexico as BP choked off the flow from its ruptured undersea well. But this is only a temporary solution. The company hopes it will be able to conduct a "static kill" of the well, which should seal it for good.

Millions of gallons of oil had poured into the Gulf beginning with an explosion on April 20 of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig that killed 11 workers and led to an economic and environmental catastrophe along the U.S. Gulf Coast. The huge spill has soiled hundreds of miles of coastline, and threatens a fragile ecosystem.

Below is a timeline of the spill and its impact:

April 20, 2010—Explosion and fire on Transocean's drilling rig Deepwater Horizon licensed to BP 11 workers are killed. The rig was drilling in BP's Macondo project 42 miles southeast of Venice, Louisiana, beneath about 5,000 feet of water and 13,000 feet under the seabed.

April 22—The Deepwater Horizon rig, valued at more than $560 million, sinks and a five mile long oil slick is seen.

April 25—The Coast Guard says remote underwater cameras detect the well is leaking 1,000 barrels of crude oil per day. It approves a plan to have remote underwater vehicles activate a blowout preventer and stop leak. Efforts to activate the blowout preventer fail.

April 28—The Coast Guard says the flow of oil is 5,000 barrels per day (bpd) (210,000 gallons/795,000 litres)—five times greater than first estimated. A controlled burn is held on the giant oil slick.

April 29—Obama pledges "every single available resource," including the U.S. military, to contain the spreading spill. Obama also says BP is responsible for the cleanup. Louisiana declares state of emergency due to the threat to the state's natural resources.

April 30—An Obama aide says no drilling will be allowed in new areas, as the president had recently proposed, until the cause of the Deepwater Horizon accident is known. BP Chairman Tony Hayward says the company takes full responsibility for the spill and would pay all legitimate claims and the cost of the cleanup.

May 2—Obama visits the Gulf Coast to see cleanup efforts first hand. U.S. officials close areas affected by the spill to fishing for an initial period of 10 days. BP starts to drill a relief well alongside the failed well, a process that could take two to three months to complete.

May 5—A barge begins towing a 98-ton containment chamber to the site of the leak. BP says one of the three leaks has been shut off by capping a valve, but that would not cut the amount of oil gushing out.

May 6—Oil washes ashore on the Chandeleur Islands off the Louisiana coast, uninhabited barrier islands that are part of the Breton National Wildlife Refuge.

May 7—BP tries to lower a containment dome over the leak, but the 100-ton device was rendered useless by a slush of frozen hydrocarbons that clogged it. A fishing ban for federal waters off the Gulf is modified, expanded and extended to May 17.

May 9—BP says it might try to plug the undersea leak by pumping materials such as shredded up tires and golf balls into the well at high pressure, a method called a "junk shot."

May 11/12—Executives from BP, Transocean and Halliburton appear at congressional hearings in Washington. Senate Energy committee chairman Jeff Bingaman says that it appeared that the explosion on the rig was due to a "cascade of errors, technical, human and regulatory. The executives blame each other's companies.

May 14—Obama slams companies involved in the spill, criticizing them for a "ridiculous spectacle" of publicly trading blame over the accident in his sternest comments yet.

May 16—BP succeeds in inserting a tube into the leaking well and capturing some oil and gas.

May 18—The U.S. nearly doubles a no-fishing zone in waters affected by the oil, extending it to 19 percent of U.S. waters in the Gulf.

May 19—The first heavy oil from the spill sloshes ashore in fragile Louisiana marshlands and part of the mess enters a powerful current that could carry it to Florida and beyond.

May 26—A "top kill" maneuver starts involving pumping heavy fluids and other material into the well shaft to stifle the flow, then sealing it with cement.

May 28—Obama tours the Louisiana Gulf coast on his second visit. "I am the president and the buck stops with me," he said. BP CEO Tony Hayward flies over the Gulf. BP says that the cost of the disaster so far is $930 million.

May 29—BP says the complex "top kill" maneuver to plug the well has failed, crushing hopes for a quick end to the largest oil spill in U.S. history already in its 40th day.

May 31—The U.S. government and BP are warning that the blown-out oil well may not be stopped until August as the company prepares a new attempt to capture leaking crude.

June 1—BP shares plunge 17 percent in London trading, wiping $23 billion off its market value, on news its latest attempt to plug the well has failed.

June 2 — BP continues work on a new plan to try to capture most of the escaping oil. This involves using robot submarines to cut off what is left of the leaking riser pipe, then lowering a containment cap over the wellhead assembly. Some difficulties are encountered with the cutting operation. — U.S. authorities expand fishing restrictions to cover 37 percent of U.S. federal waters in the Gulf.

June 3 — After previous sharp declines, BP shares rise more than 3 percent on market hopes that the latest plan to control the leaking well may make some progress. The six-week-old crisis has wiped a third off BP's market value since it began.

June 4 — BP's containment cap is said to be collecting about 1,000 barrels per day. The government estimates 19,000 barrels a day could be gushing.

  • Tar balls wash ashore in northwest Florida, the first apparent impact there from the spill.
  • Obama, on his third trip to the region, warns BP against skimping on compensation to residents and businesses.

June 6 — BP say its latest effort had captured 10,500 barrels of oil (439,950 gallons/s) in 24 hours and a second containment system should soon enable it to control the vast majority of oil.

June 7 — BP, which says it has now spent $1.25 billion on the spill, sees shares gain on news of the progress in containing the leak but still faces tough questions from investors and U.S. lawmakers.

June 8 — Obama says he wants to know "whose ass to kick" over the spill, adding to the pressure on BP. In an TV interview Obama also says that if Hayward worked for him, he would have fired him by now.

  • U.S. weather forecasters give their first confirmation that some of the oil leaking has lingered beneath the surface rather than rising to the top.

June 9 — BP efforts to stop the oil spill are to come under U.S. congressional scrutiny.

June 10 — In his first comments, Prime Minister David Cameron says Britain is ready to help BP deal with the spill.

  • U.S. scientists double their estimates of the amount of oil gushing from the well, saying between 20,000 and 40,000 barrels (840,000 and 1.7 million gallons/3.2 million and 6.4 million liters) flowed out before June 3.

June 11 — Supportive comments from Britain lift BP's shares in London by 6.4 percent. But the rise does not mend the damage done—the company is worth 70 billion pounds ($102 billion) against more than 120 billion pounds in April.

June 14 — Obama, on his fourth trip to the Gulf, says he will press BP executives at a White House meeting on June 16 to deal "justly, fairly and promptly" with damage claims.

  • Two U.S. lawmakers release a letter to Hayward saying: "It appears that BP repeatedly chose risky procedures in order to reduce costs and save time and made minimal efforts to contain the added risk."

June 15 — Lawmakers summon top executives from Exxon Mobil , Chevron , ConocoPhillips , Royal Dutch Shell and BP.

  • Obama says in his first televised speech from the Oval Office: "But make no mistake: we will fight this spill with everything we've got for as long it takes. We will make BP pay for the damage their company has caused."

June 16 — BP agrees to set up a $20 billion fund for damage claims from the spill, suspends dividend payments to shareholders and says it will pay $100 million to workers idled by the six-month moratorium on deep-sea drilling.

June 17 — Hayward faces the wrath of U.S. lawmakers as he appears before a congressional hearing. He apologizes for the spill and says everything is being done to stop it. Members of Congress accuse BP of cutting corners and ignoring warnings for the sake of profit.

June 18 — Anadarko Petroleum , part owner of the gushing well, says BP's behavior before the blowout was "reckless" and likely represented "gross negligence or willful misconduct" that would affect obligations of the well owners under their operating agreement.

June 22 — Hayward is handing day-to-day control of the spill operation to Bob Dudley — a reflection, says BP, of the need for the chief executive to return to other aspects of the energy giant's business.

June 24 — A U.S. judge refuses to put on hold his decision to lift a ban on deepwater drilling imposed in response to the spill.

June 27 — Oil washes ashore on mainland Mississippi for the first time, although some had tainted its barrier islands.

June 28 — BP is forced to defend its chief executive after Russia's deputy prime minister said he expected Hayward to resign soon.

  • BP says it is now spending $100 million a day on efforts to cap the well, clean up the spill and compensate those affected, bringing the total bill so far to $2.65 billion.
  • Oil from the spill washed ashore at one of the largest tourist beaches in Mississippi on Monday, forcing tourists to pack their bags and evacuate the shore.

June 29 — BP said that its oil-capture systems at the leaking well in the Gulf of Mexico collected or burned off 25,220 barrels of oil on Tuesday.

  • A U.S. appeals court set oral arguments for July 8 on the Obama administration's request to stay a ruling that lifted its six-month moratorium on deepwater oil drilling in response to the spill.
  • U.S. lawmakers investigating the BP spill asked major energy companies for information on their response plans after it was discovered some companies' plans had errors including protecting species that don't live in the Gulf of Mexico.
  • Tropical Storm Alex neared hurricane strength with high winds and vast waves set to hamper BP latest efforts to contain the spill

June 30 — Rough weather whipped up by the season's first Atlantic hurricane is disrupting cleanup of the massive BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, delaying plans to boost containment capacity and threatening to push more oily water onshore.

  • A U.S. Senate committee Wednesday voted to eliminate limits on liability that oil companies would face for damages stemming from offshore spills like the one in the Gulf of Mexico. Currently, companies enjoy a $75 million cap for compensating local communities for economic losses and for cleaning up environmental damages.

June 30 — Hurricane Alex, later downgraded to a tropical storm, moved slowly inPTKwaters, disrupting the cleanup, and threatening to push more oily water onshore.

  • President Obama formally directs officials to draw up a long-term economic and environmental plan to help the Gulf Coast region get back on its feet after the oil spill.

July 1 — BP shares gain, with traders initially citing talk, quickly shot down, that it had capped the leaking well.

July 3 — A supertanker converted into a "super skimmer" begins tests. The vessel can remove up to 500,000 barrels (21 million gallons/79.5 million liters) of oil and water from the sea surface a day.

July 5 — BP says that the cost of the spill had reached $3.12 billion.

July 6 — Summer storms push oil from the Gulf of Mexico spill deeper into Louisiana's wetlands and temporarily slow efforts to contain damage.

  • The storms are also responsible for washing oil into Lake Pontchartraiw ordering New Orleans, further polluting Mississippi's beaches and halting tests on a supertanker adapted to skim large quantities of oil from the surface.

July 7 — Tests show tar balls washed up on the Texas coast are from the spill, meaning every U.S. Gulf state — Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida and now Texas — has been soiled by the spill.

July 8 — A U.S. appeals court deals the Obama administration a setback as it refuses to halt deepwater oil drilling.

July 10 — BP remove a containment cap from the oil well in the first step toward installing a bigger cap.

July 11 — BP say it is making progress on a new system to capture almost all the leaking oil.

July 12 — BP installs a "capping stack,'' which has a better seal than the last cap placed on the well and aims to stop oil from spewing out.

BP starts shutting a sequence of valves after getting approval from the U.S. government, delaying testing by 24 hours on fears the process could irreparably damage the well. BP starts a critical pressure test to gauge pressure in the well on July 14.

July 15 — BP says it has stopped the leak—at least during testing—with the new tight-sealing containment cap.

July 16 — The company carries out tests on whether the well remains intact as it moves to plug the leak permanently with the relief well intended to intersect the ruptured well and and seal it with mud and cement in August.

July 19 — BP says it has spent $3.95 billion so far on efforts to tackle its leaking well.

July 20 — BP says it has reached a deal to sell $7 billion in assets to Apache Corp as it raises money to cover costs related to the spill.

July 23 — BP says it is temporarily suspending relief well activities due to the approach of Tropical Storm Bonnie.

July 27 — BP names American Bob Dudley as its next CEO, saying Tony Hayward will stand down on Oct. 1.


Deepwater Horizon drilling rig Edit

The Deepwater Horizon was a 9-year-old [31] semi-submersible, mobile, floating, dynamically positioned drilling rig that could operate in waters up to 10,000 feet (3,000 m) deep. [32] Built by South Korean company Hyundai Heavy Industries [33] and owned by Transocean, the rig operated under the Marshallese flag of convenience, and was chartered to BP from March 2008 to September 2013. [2] It was drilling a deep exploratory well, 18,360 feet (5,600 m) below sea level, in approximately 5,100 feet (1,600 m) of water. The well is situated in the Macondo Prospect in Mississippi Canyon Block 252 (MC252) of the Gulf of Mexico, in the United States' exclusive economic zone. The Macondo well is found roughly 41 miles (66 km) off the Louisiana coast. [34] [35] BP was the operator and principal developer of the Macondo Prospect with a 65% share, while 25% was owned by Anadarko Petroleum, and 10% by MOEX Offshore 2007, a unit of Mitsui. [36]

Explosion Edit

At approximately 7:45 pm CDT , on 20 April 2010, high-pressure methane gas from the well expanded into the marine riser and rose into the drilling rig, where it ignited and exploded, engulfing the platform. [37] [38] Eleven missing workers were never found despite a three-day U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) search operation and are believed to have died in the explosion. [39] [40] Ninety-four crew members were rescued by lifeboat or helicopter, 17 of whom were treated for injuries. [37] [41] The Deepwater Horizon sank on the morning of 22 April 2010.

The oil leak was discovered on the afternoon of 22 April 2010 when a large oil slick began to spread at the former rig site. [42] The oil flowed for 87 days. BP originally estimated a flow rate of 1,000 to 5,000 barrels per day (160 to 790 m 3 /d). The Flow Rate Technical Group (FRTG) estimated the initial flow rate was 62,000 barrels per day (9,900 m 3 /d). [43] [44] [45] The total estimated volume of leaked oil approximated 4.9 million barrels (210 million US gal 780,000 m 3 ) with plus or minus 10% uncertainty, [3] including oil that was collected, [46] making it the world's largest accidental spill. [6] [47] BP challenged the higher figure, saying that the government overestimated the volume. Internal emails released in 2013 showed that one BP employee had estimates that matched those of the FRTG, and shared the data with supervisors, but BP continued with their lower number. [48] [49] The company argued that government figures do not reflect over 810,000 barrels (34 million US gal 129,000 m 3 ) of oil that was collected or burned before it could enter the Gulf waters. [46]

According to the satellite images, the spill directly affected 70,000 square miles (180,000 km 2 ) of ocean, which is comparable to the size of Oklahoma. [4] [50] By early June 2010, oil had washed up on 125 miles (201 km) of Louisiana's coast and along the Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama coastlines. [51] [52] Oil sludge appeared in the Intracoastal Waterway and on Pensacola Beach and the Gulf Islands National Seashore. [53] In late June, oil reached Gulf Park Estates, its first appearance in Mississippi. [54] In July, tar balls reached Grand Isle and the shores of Lake Pontchartrain. [55] [56] In September a new wave of oil suddenly coated 16 miles (26 km) of Louisiana coastline and marshes west of the Mississippi River in Plaquemines Parish. [57] In October, weathered oil reached Texas. [58] As of July 2011 [update] , about 491 miles (790 km) of coastline in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida were contaminated by oil and a total of 1,074 miles (1,728 km) had been oiled since the spill began. [59] As of December 2012 [update] , 339 miles (546 km) of coastline remain subject to evaluation and/or cleanup operations. [60]

Concerns were raised about the appearance of underwater, horizontally extended plumes of dissolved oil. Researchers concluded that deep plumes of dissolved oil and gas would likely remain confined to the northern Gulf of Mexico and that the peak impact on dissolved oxygen would be delayed and long lasting. [61] Two weeks after the wellhead was capped on 15 July 2010, the surface oil appeared to have dissipated, while an unknown amount of subsurface oil remained. [62] Estimates of the residual ranged from a 2010 NOAA report that claimed about half of the oil remained below the surface to independent estimates of up to 75%. [63] [64] [65]

That means that over 100 million US gallons (380 Ml) (2.4 million barrels) remained in the Gulf. [60] As of January 2011 [update] , tar balls, oil sheen trails, fouled wetlands marsh grass and coastal sands were still evident. Subsurface oil remained offshore and in fine silts. [66] In April 2012, oil was still found along as much as 200 miles (320 km) of Louisiana coastline and tar balls continued to wash up on the barrier islands. [67] In 2013, some scientists at the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill and Ecosystem Science Conference said that as much as one-third of the oil may have mixed with deep ocean sediments, where it risks damage to ecosystems and commercial fisheries. [68]

In 2013, more than 4,600,000 pounds (2,100 t) of "oiled material" was removed from the Louisiana coast. [16] [69] Although only "minute" quantities of oil continued to wash up in 2013, patches of tar balls were still being reported almost every day from Alabama and Florida Panhandle beaches. Regular cleanup patrols were no longer considered justified but cleanup was being conducted on an as-needed basis, in response to public reports. [70]

It was first thought that oil had not reached as far as Tampa Bay, Florida however, a study done in 2013 found that one of the plumes of dispersant-treated oil had reached a shelf 80 miles (130 km) off the Tampa Bay region. According to researchers, there is "some evidence it may have caused lesions in fish caught in that area". [17] [71]

Short-term efforts Edit

First, BP unsuccessfully attempted to close the blowout preventer valves on the wellhead with remotely operated underwater vehicles. [72] [73] Next, it placed a 125-tonne (280,000 lb) containment dome over the largest leak and piped the oil to a storage vessel. While this technique had worked in shallower water, it failed here when gas combined with cold water to form methane hydrate crystals that blocked the opening at the top of the dome. [74] Pumping heavy drilling fluids into the blowout preventer to restrict the flow of oil before sealing it permanently with cement ("top kill") also failed. [75] [76]

BP then inserted a riser insertion tube into the pipe and a stopper-like washer around the tube plugged at the end of the riser and diverted the flow into the insertion tube. [77] The collected gas was flared and oil stored on board the drillship Discoverer Enterprise. [78] Before the tube was removed, it collected 924,000 US gallons (22,000 bbl 3,500 m 3 ) of oil. [79] On 3 June 2010, BP removed the damaged drilling riser from the top of the blowout preventer and covered the pipe by the cap which connected it to another riser. [80] On 16 June, a second containment system connected directly to the blowout preventer began carrying oil and gas to service vessels, where it was consumed in a clean-burning system. [81] The United States government's estimates suggested the cap and other equipment were capturing less than half of the leaking oil. [53] On 10 July, the containment cap was removed to replace it with a better-fitting cap ("Top Hat Number 10"). [82] [83] Mud and cement were later pumped in through the top of the well to reduce the pressure inside it (which didn't work either). A final device was created to attach a chamber of larger diameter than the flowing pipe with a flange that bolted to the top of the blowout preventer and a manual valve set to close off the flow once attached. On 15 July, the device was secured and time was taken closing the valves to ensure the attachment under increasing pressure until the valves were closed completing the temporary measures. [84]

Well declared "effectively dead" Edit

Transocean's Development Driller III started drilling a first relief well on 2 May 2010. GSF Development Driller II started drilling a second relief on 16 May 2010. [85] [86] [87] On 3 August 2010, first test oil and then drilling mud was pumped at a slow rate of approximately 2 barrels (320 L) per minute into the well-head. Pumping continued for eight hours, at the end of which the well was declared to be "in a static condition." [88] On 4 August 2010, BP began pumping cement from the top, sealing that part of the flow channel permanently. [89]

On 3 September 2010, the 300-ton failed blowout preventer was removed from the well and a replacement blowout preventer was installed. [90] [91] On 16 September 2010, the relief well reached its destination and pumping of cement to seal the well began. [92] On 19 September 2010, National Incident Commander Thad Allen declared the well "effectively dead" and said that it posed no further threat to the Gulf. [10]

Recurrent or continued leakage Edit

In May 2010, BP admitted they had "discovered things that were broken in the sub-surface" during the "top kill" effort. [93]

Oil slicks were reported in March [94] and August 2011, [95] [96] in March [11] and October 2012, [97] [98] [99] and in January 2013. [100] Repeated scientific analyses confirmed that the sheen was a chemical match for oil from the Macondo well. [101] [102]

The USCG initially said the oil was too dispersed to recover and posed no threat to the coastline, [103] but later warned BP and Transocean that they might be held financially responsible for cleaning up the new oil. [104] USGS director Marcia McNutt stated that the riser pipe could hold at most 1,000 barrels (160 m 3 ) because it is open on both ends, making it unlikely to hold the amount of oil being observed. [105]

In October 2012, BP reported that they had found and plugged leaking oil from the failed containment dome, now abandoned about 1,500 feet (460 m) from the main well. [106] [107] [108] In December 2012, the USCG conducted a subsea survey no oil coming from the wells or the wreckage was found and its source remains unknown. [60] [109] In addition, a white, milky substance was observed seeping from the wreckage. According to BP and the USCG, it is "not oil and it's not harmful." [110]

In January 2013, BP said that they were continuing to investigate possible sources of the oil sheen. Chemical data implied that the substance might be residual oil leaking from the wreckage. If that proves to be the case, the sheen can be expected to eventually disappear. Another possibility is that it is formation oil escaping from the subsurface, using the Macondo well casing as flow conduit, possibly intersecting a naturally occurring fault, and then following that to escape at the surface some distance from the wellhead. If it proves to be oil from the subsurface, then that could indicate the possibility of an indefinite release of oil. The oil slick was comparable in size to naturally occurring oil seeps and was not large enough to pose an immediate threat to wildlife. [11] [111]

The fundamental strategies for addressing the spill were containment, dispersal and removal. In summer 2010, approximately 47,000 people and 7,000 vessels were involved in the project. By 3 October 2012, federal response costs amounted to $850 million, mostly reimbursed by BP. As of January 2013 [update] , 935 personnel were still involved. By that time cleanup had cost BP over $14 billion. [60]

It was estimated with plus-or-minus 10% uncertainty that 4.9 million barrels (780,000 m 3 ) of oil was released from the well 4.1 million barrels (650,000 m 3 ) of oil went into the Gulf. [112] The report led by the Department of the Interior and the NOAA said that "75% [of oil] has been cleaned up by Man or Mother Nature" however, only about 25% of released oil was collected or removed while about 75% of oil remained in the environment in one form or another. [113] In 2012, Markus Huettel, a benthic ecologist at Florida State University, maintained that while much of BP's oil was degraded or evaporated, at least 60% remains unaccounted for. [114]

In May 2010, a local native set up a network for people to volunteer their assistance in cleaning up beaches. Boat captains were given the opportunity to offer the use of their boats to help clean and prevent the oil from further spreading. To assist with the efforts the captains had to register their ships with the Vessels of Opportunity however, an issue arose when more boats registered than actually participated in the clean-up efforts - only a third of the registered boats. Many local supporters were disappointed with BP's slow response, prompting the formation of The Florida Key Environmental Coalition. This coalition gained significant influence in the clean up of the oil spill to try and gain some control over the situation. [115]

Containment Edit

Containment booms stretching over 4,200,000 feet (1,300 km) were deployed, either to corral the oil or as barriers to protect marshes, mangroves, shrimp/crab/oyster ranches or other ecologically sensitive areas. Booms extend 18–48 inches (0.46–1.22 m) above and below the water surface and were effective only in relatively calm and slow-moving waters. Including one-time use sorbent booms, a total of 13,300,000 feet (4,100 km) of booms were deployed. [116] Booms were criticized for washing up on the shore with the oil, allowing oil to escape above or below the boom, and for ineffectiveness in more than three to four-foot (90–120 cm) waves. [117] [118] [119]

The Louisiana barrier island plan was developed to construct barrier islands to protect the coast of Louisiana. The plan was criticised for its expense and poor results. [120] [121] Critics allege that the decision to pursue the project was political with little scientific input. [122] The EPA expressed concern that the booms would threaten wildlife. [123]

For a time, a group called Matter of Trust, citing insufficient availability of manufactured oil absorption booms, campaigned to encourage hair salons, dog groomers and sheep farmers to donate hair, fur and wool clippings, stuffed in pantyhose or tights, to help contain oil near impacted shores, a technique dating back to the Exxon Valdez disaster. [124] [125]

Use of Corexit dispersant Edit

The spill was also notable for the volume of Corexit oil dispersant used and for application methods that were "purely experimental." [116] Altogether, 1.84 million US gallons (7,000 m 3 ) of dispersants were used of this 771,000 US gallons (2,920 m 3 ) were released at the wellhead. [13] Subsea injection had never previously been tried but due to the spill's unprecedented nature BP together with USCG and EPA decided to use it. [126] Over 400 sorties were flown to release the product. [116] Although usage of dispersants was described as "the most effective and fast moving tool for minimizing shoreline impact", [116] the approach continues to be investigated. [127] [128] [129]

A 2011 analysis conducted by Earthjustice and Toxipedia showed that the dispersant could contain cancer-causing agents, hazardous toxins and endocrine-disrupting chemicals. [130] Environmental scientists expressed concerns that the dispersants add to the toxicity of a spill, increasing the threat to sea turtles and bluefin tuna. The dangers are even greater when poured into the source of a spill, because they are picked up by the current and wash through the Gulf. [131] According to BP and federal officials, dispersant use stopped after the cap was in place [132] [133] however, marine toxicologist Riki Ott wrote in an open letter to the EPA that Corexit use continued after that date [134] and a GAP investigation stated that "[a] majority of GAP witnesses cited indications that Corexit was used after [July 2010]." [135]

According to a NALCO manual obtained by GAP, Corexit 9527 is an “eye and skin irritant. Repeated or excessive exposure . may cause injury to red blood cells (hemolysis), kidney or the liver.” The manual adds: “Excessive exposure may cause central nervous system effects, nausea, vomiting, anesthetic or narcotic effects.” It advises, “Do not get in eyes, on skin, on clothing,” and “Wear suitable protective clothing.” For Corexit 9500 the manual advised, “Do not get in eyes, on skin, on clothing,” “Avoid breathing vapor,” and “Wear suitable protective clothing.” According to FOIA requests obtained by GAP, neither the protective gear nor the manual were distributed to Gulf oil spill cleanup workers.

Corexit EC9500A and Corexit EC9527A were the principal variants. [136] The two formulations are neither the least toxic, nor the most effective, among EPA's approved dispersants, but BP said it chose to use Corexit because it was available the week of the rig explosion. [137] [138] On 19 May, the EPA gave BP 24 hours to choose less toxic alternatives to Corexit from the National Contingency Plan Product Schedule, and begin applying them within 72 hours of EPA approval or provide a detailed reasoning why no approved products met the standards. [139] [140] On 20 May, BP determined that none of the alternative products met all three criteria of availability, non-toxicity and effectiveness. [141] On 24 May, EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson ordered EPA to conduct its own evaluation of alternatives and ordered BP to reduce dispersant use by 75%. [142] [143] [144] BP reduced Corexit use by 25,689 to 23,250 US gallons (97,240 to 88,010 L) per day, a 9% decline. [145] On 2 August 2010, the EPA said dispersants did no more harm to the environment than the oil and that they stopped a large amount of oil from reaching the coast by breaking it down faster. [132] However, some independent scientists and EPA's own experts continue to voice concerns about the approach. [146]

Underwater injection of Corexit into the leak may have created the oil plumes which were discovered below the surface. [138] Because the dispersants were applied at depth, much of the oil never rose to the surface. [147] One plume was 22 miles (35 km) long, more than 1 mile (1,600 m) wide and 650 feet (200 m) deep. [148] In a major study on the plume, experts were most concerned about the slow pace at which the oil was breaking down in the cold, 40 °F (4 °C) water at depths of 3,000 feet (900 m). [149]

In late 2012, a study from Georgia Tech and Universidad Autonoma de Aguascalientes in Environmental Pollution journal reported that Corexit used during the BP oil spill had increased the toxicity of the oil by 52 times. [150] The scientists concluded that "Mixing oil with dispersant increased toxicity to ecosystems" and made the gulf oil spill worse." [151] [152]

Removal Edit

The three basic approaches for removing the oil from the water were: combustion, offshore filtration, and collection for later processing. USCG said 33 million US gallons (120,000 m 3 ) of tainted water was recovered, including 5 million US gallons (19,000 m 3 ) of oil. BP said 826,800 barrels (131,450 m 3 ) had been recovered or flared. [153] It is calculated that about 5% of leaked oil was burned at the surface and 3% was skimmed. [113] On the most demanding day, 47,849 people were assigned on the response works and over 6,000 Marine vessels, 82 helicopters, and 20 fixed-wing aircraft were involved. [3]

From April to mid-July 2010, 411 controlled in-situ fires remediated approximately 265,000 barrels (11.1 million US gal 42,100 m 3 ). [116] The fires released small amounts of toxins, including cancer-causing dioxins. According to EPA's report, the released amount is not enough to pose an added cancer risk to workers and coastal residents, while a second research team concluded that there was only a small added risk. [154]

Oil was collected from water by using skimmers. In total 2,063 various skimmers were used. [3] For offshore, more than 60 open-water skimmers were deployed, including 12 purpose-built vehicles. [116] EPA regulations prohibited skimmers that left more than 15 parts per million (ppm) of oil in the water. Many large-scale skimmers exceeded the limit. [155] Due to use of Corexit the oil was too dispersed to collect, according to a spokesperson for shipowner TMT. [156] In mid-June 2010, BP ordered 32 machines that separate oil and water, with each machine capable of extracting up to 2,000 barrels per day (320 m 3 /d). [157] [158] After one week of testing, BP began to proceed [159] and by 28 June, had removed 890,000 barrels (141,000 m 3 ). [160]

After the well was capped, the cleanup of shore became the main task of the response works. Two main types of affected coast were sandy beaches and marshes. On beaches the main techniques were sifting sand, removing tar balls, and digging out tar mats manually or by using mechanical devices. [3] For marshes, techniques such as vacuum and pumping, low-pressure flush, vegetation cutting, and bioremediation were used. [116]

Oil-eating microbes Edit

Dispersants are said to facilitate the digestion of the oil by microbes. Mixing dispersants with oil at the wellhead would keep some oil below the surface and in theory, allowing microbes to digest the oil before it reached the surface. Various risks were identified and evaluated, in particular, that an increase in microbial activity might reduce subsea oxygen levels, threatening fish and other animals. [161]

Several studies suggest that microbes successfully consumed part of the oil. [60] [162] By mid-September, other research claimed that microbes mainly digested natural gas rather than oil. [163] [164] David L. Valentine, a professor of microbial geochemistry at UC Santa Barbara, said that the capability of microbes to break down the leaked oil had been greatly exaggerated. [165] However, biogeochemist Chris Reddy, said natural microorganisms are a big reason why the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was not far worse. [166] [167]

Genetically modified Alcanivorax borkumensis was added to the waters to speed digestion. [165] [168] The delivery method of microbes to oil patches was proposed by the Russian Research and Development Institute of Ecology and the Sustainable Use of Natural Resources. [169]

On 18 May 2010, BP was designated the lead "Responsible Party" under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which meant that BP had operational authority in coordinating the response. [170] [171]

The first video images were released on 12 May, and further video images were released by members of Congress who had been given access to them by BP. [172]

During the spill response operations, at the request of the Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) implemented a 900-square-mile (2,300 km 2 ) temporary flight restriction zone over the operations area. [173] [174] [175] Restrictions were to prevent civilian air traffic from interfering with aircraft assisting the response effort. [172] All flights in the operations' area were prohibited except flight authorized by air traffic control routine flights supporting offshore oil operations federal, state, local and military flight operations supporting spill response and air ambulance and law enforcement operations. Exceptions for these restrictions were granted on a case-by-case basis dependent on safety issues, operational requirements, weather conditions, and traffic volume. No flights, except aircraft conducting aerial chemical dispersing operations, or for landing and takeoff, were allowed below 1,000 metres (3,300 ft). [173] Notwithstanding restrictions, there were 800 to 1,000 flights per day during the operations. [176]

Local and federal authorities citing BP's authority denied access to members of the press attempting to document the spill from the air, from boats, and on the ground, blocking access to areas that were open to the public. [172] [177] [178] [179] [180] [181] [182] In some cases photographers were granted access only with BP officials escorting them on BP-contracted boats and aircraft. In one example, the U.S. Coast Guard stopped Jean-Michel Cousteau's boat and allowed it to proceed only after the Coast Guard was assured that no journalists were on board. [179] In another example, a CBS News crew was denied access to the oil-covered beaches of the spill area. The CBS crew was told by the authorities: "this is BP's rules, not ours," when trying to film the area. [179] [183] [184] Some members of Congress criticized the restrictions placed on access by journalists. [172]

The FAA denied that BP employees or contractors made decisions on flights and access, saying those decisions were made by the FAA and Coast Guard. [172] [175] The FAA acknowledged that media access was limited to hired planes or helicopters, but was arranged through the Coast Guard. [176] The Coast Guard and BP denied having a policy of restricting journalists they noted that members of the media had been embedded with the authorities and allowed to cover response efforts since the beginning of the effort, with more than 400 embeds aboard boats and aircraft to date. [181] They also said that they wanted to provide access to the information while maintaining safety. [181]

On 15 April 2014, BP announced that cleanup along the coast was substantially complete, while the United States Coast Guard work continued using physical barriers such as floating booms, the cleanup workers' objective was to keep the oil from spreading any further. They used skimmer boats to remove a majority of the oil and they used sorbents to absorb any remnant of oil like a sponge. Although that method did not remove the oil completely, chemicals called dispersants are used to hasten the oil's degradation to prevent the oil from doing further damage to the marine habitats below the surface water. For the Deep Horizon oil spill, cleanup workers used 1,400,000 US gallons (5,300,000 l 1,200,000 imp gal) of various chemical dispersants to further breakdown the oil. [185]

The State of Louisiana was funded by BP to do regular testing of fish, shellfish, water, and sand. Initial testing regularly showed detectable levels of dioctyl sodium sulfosuccinate, a chemical used in the clean up. Testing over the past year (2019) reported by, for the pollutants tested have not produced results. [186]

Environmental impact Edit

The spill area hosts 8,332 species, including more than 1,270 fish, 604 polychaetes, 218 birds, 1,456 mollusks, 1,503 crustaceans, 4 sea turtles and 29 marine mammals. [187] [188] Between May and June 2010, the spill waters contained 40 times more polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) than before the spill. [189] [190] PAHs are often linked to oil spills and include carcinogens and chemicals that pose various health risks to humans and marine life. The PAHs were most concentrated near the Louisiana Coast, but levels also jumped 2–3 fold in areas off Alabama, Mississippi and Florida. [190] PAHs can harm marine species directly and microbes used to consume the oil can reduce marine oxygen levels. [191] The oil contained approximately 40% methane by weight, compared to about 5% found in typical oil deposits. [192] Methane can potentially suffocate marine life and create "dead zones" where oxygen is depleted. [192]

A 2014 study of the effects of the oil spill on bluefin tuna funded by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Stanford University, and the Monterey Bay Aquarium and published in the journal Science, found that the toxins from oil spills can cause irregular heartbeats leading to cardiac arrest. Calling the vicinity of the spill "one of the most productive ocean ecosystems in the world", the study found that even at very low concentrations "PAH cardiotoxicity was potentially a common form of injury among a broad range of species in the vicinity of the oil." [19] Another peer-reviewed study, released in March 2014 and conducted by 17 scientists from the United States and Australia and published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, found that tuna and amberjack that were exposed to oil from the spill developed deformities of the heart and other organs that would be expected to be fatal or at least life-shortening. The scientists said that their findings would most likely apply to other large predator fish and "even to humans, whose developing hearts are in many ways similar." BP responded that the concentrations of oil in the study were a level rarely seen in the Gulf, but The New York Times reported that the BP statement was contradicted by the study. [20]

The oil dispersant Corexit, previously only used as a surface application, was released underwater in unprecedented amounts, with the intent of making it more easily biodegraded by naturally occurring microbes. Thus, oil that would normally rise to the surface of the water was emulsified into tiny droplets and remained suspended in the water and on the sea floor. [193] The oil and dispersant mixture permeated the food chain through zooplankton. [190] [194] [195] Signs of an oil-and-dispersant mix were found under the shells of tiny blue crab larvae. [196] A study of insect populations in the coastal marshes affected by the spill also found a significant impact. [197] Chemicals from the spill were found in migratory birds as far away as Minnesota. Pelican eggs contained "petroleum compounds and Corexit". [129] Dispersant and PAHs from oil are believed to have caused "disturbing numbers" of mutated fish that scientists and commercial fishers saw in 2012, including 50% of shrimp found lacking eyes and eye sockets. [198] [199] Fish with oozing sores and lesions were first noted by fishermen in November 2010. [200] Prior to the spill, approximately 0.1% of Gulf fish had lesions or sores. A report from the University of Florida said that many locations showed 20% of fish with lesions, while later estimates reached 50%. [200] In October 2013, Al Jazeera reported that the gulf ecosystem was "in crisis", citing a decline in seafood catches, as well as deformities and lesions found in fish. [201] According to J. Christopher Haney, Harold Geiger, and Jeffrey Short, three researchers with extensive experience in environmental monitoring and post-spill mortality assessments, over one million coastal birds died as a direct result of the Deepwater Horizon spill. These numbers, coupled with the National Audubon Society scientists' observations of bird colonies and bird mortality well after the acute phase, have led scientists to conclude that more than one million birds ultimately succumbed to the lethal effects of the Gulf oil spill.

In July 2010, it was reported that the spill was "already having a 'devastating' effect on marine life in the Gulf". [202] Damage to the ocean floor especially endangered the Louisiana pancake batfish whose range is entirely contained within the spill-affected area. [203] In March 2012, a definitive link was found between the death of a Gulf coral community and the spill. [204] [205] [206] [207] According to NOAA, a cetacean Unusual Mortality Event (UME) has been recognized since before the spill began, NOAA is investigating possible contributing factors to the ongoing UME from the Deepwater Horizon spill, with the possibility of eventual criminal charges being filed if the spill is shown to be connected. [208] Some estimates are that only 2% of the carcasses of killed mammals have been recovered. [209]

In the first birthing season for dolphins after the spill, dead baby dolphins washed up along Mississippi and Alabama shorelines at about 10 times the normal number. [210] [ dead link ] A peer-reviewed NOAA/BP study disclosed that nearly half the bottlenose dolphins tested in mid-2011 in Barataria Bay, a heavily oiled area, were in “guarded or worse” condition, "including 17 percent that were not expected to survive". BP officials deny that the disease conditions are related to the spill, saying that dolphin deaths actually began being reported before the BP oil spill. [197] [211] [212] By 2013, over 650 dolphins had been found stranded in the oil spill area, a four-fold increase over the historical average. [213] The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) reports that sea turtles, mostly endangered Kemp’s ridley sea turtles, have been stranding at a high rate. Before the spill there was an average of 100 strandings per year since the spill the number has jumped to roughly 500. [214] NWF senior scientist Doug Inkley notes that the marine death rates are unprecedented and occurring high in the food chain, strongly suggesting there is "something amiss with the Gulf ecosystem". [215] In December 2013, the journal Environmental Science & Technology published a study finding that of 32 dolphins briefly captured from 24-km stretch near southeastern Louisiana, half were seriously ill or dying. BP said the report was “inconclusive as to any causation associated with the spill”. [216] [217]

In 2012, tar balls continued to wash up along the Gulf coast [218] [219] [220] [221] and in 2013, tar balls could still be found in on the Mississippi and Louisiana coasts, along with oil sheens in marshes and signs of severe erosion of coastal islands, brought about by the death of trees and marsh grass from exposure to the oil. [222] In 2013, former NASA physicist Bonny Schumaker noted a "dearth of marine life" in a radius 30 to 50 miles (48 to 80 km) around the well, after flying over the area numerous times since May 2010. [223] [224]

In 2013, researchers found that oil on the bottom of the seafloor did not seem to be degrading, [225] and observed a phenomenon called a "dirty blizzard": oil in the water column began clumping around suspended sediments, and falling to the ocean floor in an "underwater rain of oily particles." The result could have long-term effects because oil could remain in the food chain for generations. [226]

A 2014 bluefin tuna study in Science found that oil already broken down by wave action and chemical dispersants was more toxic than fresh oil. [227] A 2015 study of the relative toxicity of oil and dispersants to coral also found that the dispersants were more toxic than the oil. [228]

A 2015 study by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, published in PLOS ONE, links the sharp increase in dolphin deaths to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. [229] [230]

On 12 April 2016, a research team reported that 88 percent of about 360 baby or stillborn dolphins within the spill area "had abnormal or under-developed lungs", compared to 15 percent in other areas. The study was published in the April 2016 Diseases of Aquatic Organisms. [231]

Health consequences Edit

By June 2010, 143 spill-exposure cases had been reported to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals 108 of those involved workers in the clean-up efforts, while 35 were reported by residents. [232] Chemicals from the oil and dispersant are believed to be the cause it is believed that the addition of dispersants made the oil more toxic. [233]

The United States Department of Health and Human Services set up the GuLF Study in June 2010 in response to these reports. The study is run by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, and will last at least five years. [234] [235]

Mike Robicheux, a Louisiana physician, described the situation as "the biggest public health crisis from a chemical poisoning in the history of this country." [236] In July, after testing the blood of BP cleanup workers and residents in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida for volatile organic compounds, environmental scientist Wilma Subra said she was "finding amounts 5 to 10 times in excess of the 95th percentile" she said that "the presence of these chemicals in the blood indicates exposure." [235] [237] [238] Riki Ott, a marine toxicologist with experience of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, advised families to evacuate the Gulf. [239] She said that workers from the Valdez spill had suffered long-term health consequences. [240]

Following the 26 May 2010 hospitalization of seven fishermen that were working in the cleanup crew, BP requested that the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health perform a Health Hazard Evaluation. This was to cover all offshore cleanup activities, BP later requested a second NIOSH investigation of onshore cleanup operations. Tests for chemical exposure in the seven fishermen were negative NIOSH concluded that the hospitalizations were most likely a result of heat, fatigue, and terpenes that were being used to clean the decks. Review of 10 later hospitalizations found that heat exposure and dehydration were consistent findings but could not establish chemical exposure. NIOSH personnel performed air monitoring around cleanup workers at sea, on land, and during the application of Corexit. Air concentrations of volatile organic compounds and PAHs never exceeded permissible exposure levels. A limitation of their methodology was that some VOCs may have already evaporated from the oil before they began their investigation. In their report, they suggest the possibility that respiratory symptoms might have been caused by high levels of ozone or reactive aldehydes in the air, possibly produced from photochemical reactions in the oil. NIOSH did note that many of the personnel involved were not donning personal protective equipment (gloves and impermeable coveralls) as they had been instructed to and emphasized that this was important protection against transdermal absorption of chemicals from the oil. Heat stress was found to be the most pressing safety concern. [241]

Workers reported that they were not allowed to use respirators, and that their jobs were threatened if they did. [242] [243] [244] OSHA said "cleanup workers are receiving "minimal" exposure to airborne toxins. OSHA will require that BP provide certain protective clothing, but not respirators." [245] ProPublica reported that workers were being photographed while working with no protective clothing. [246] An independent investigation for Newsweek showed that BP did not hand out the legally required safety manual for use with Corexit, and were not provided with safety training or protective gear. [247]

A 2012 survey of the health effects of the spill on cleanup workers reported "eye, nose and throat irritation respiratory problems blood in urine, vomit and rectal bleeding seizures nausea and violent vomiting episodes that last for hours skin irritation, burning and lesions short-term memory loss and confusion liver and kidney damage central nervous system effects and nervous system damage hypertension and miscarriages". Dr. James Diaz, writing for the American Journal of Disaster Medicine, said these ailments appearing in the Gulf reflected those reported after previous oil spills, like the Exxon Valdez. Diaz warned that "chronic adverse health effects, including cancers, liver and kidney disease, mental health disorders, birth defects and developmental disorders should be anticipated among sensitive populations and those most heavily exposed". Diaz also believes neurological disorders should be expected. [248]

Two years after the spill, a study initiated by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health found biomarkers matching the oil from the spill in the bodies of cleanup workers. [ citation needed ] Other studies have reported a variety of mental health issues, skin problems, breathing issues, coughing, and headaches. [249] In 2013, during the three-day "Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill & Ecosystem Science Conference", [250] findings discussed included a '"significant percentage" of Gulf residents reporting mental health problems like anxiety, depression and PTSD. These studies also showed that the bodies of former spill cleanup workers carry biomarkers of "many chemicals contained in the oil". [251] [252]

A study that investigated the health effects among children in Louisiana and Florida living less than 10 miles from the coast found that more than a third of the parents reported physical or mental health symptoms among their children. The parents reported "unexplained symptoms among their children, including bleeding ears, nose bleeds, and the early start of menstruation among girls," according to David Abramson, director of Columbia University's National Center for Disaster Preparedness. [251]

A cohort study of almost 2,200 Louisiana women found "high physical/environmental exposure was significantly associated with all 13 of the physical health symptoms surveyed, with the strongest associations for burning in nose, throat or lungs sore throat dizziness and wheezing. Women who suffered a high degree of economic disruption as a result of spill were significantly more likely to report wheezing headaches watery, burning, itchy eyes and stuffy, itchy, runny nose. [253]

Economy Edit

The spill had a strong economic impact to BP [254] and also the Gulf Coast's economy sectors such as offshore drilling, fishing and tourism. Estimates of lost tourism dollars were projected to cost the Gulf coastal economy up to 22.7 billion through 2013. In addition, Louisiana reported that lost visitor spending through the end of 2010 totaled $32 million, and losses through 2013 were expected to total $153 million in this state alone. [255] [256] The Gulf of Mexico commercial fishing industry was estimated to have lost $247 million as a result of postspill fisheries closures. One study projects that the overall impact of lost or degraded commercial, recreational, and mariculture fisheries in the Gulf could be $8.7 billion by 2020, with a potential loss of 22,000 jobs over the same time frame. [256] [257] BP's expenditures on the spill included the cost of the spill response, containment, relief well drilling, grants to the Gulf states, claims paid, and federal costs, including fines and penalties. [258] Due to the loss of the market value, BP had dropped from the second to the fourth largest of the four major oil companies by 2013. [259] During the crisis, BP gas stations in the United States reported a sales drop of between 10 and 40% due to backlash against the company. [260]

Local officials in Louisiana expressed concern that the offshore drilling moratorium imposed in response to the spill would further harm the economies of coastal communities as the oil industry directly or indirectly employs about 318,000 Louisiana residents (17% of all jobs in the state). [261] NOAA had closed 86,985 square miles (225,290 km 2 ), or approximately 36% of Federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico, for commercial fishing causing $2.5 billion cost for the fishing industry. [262] [263] [264] The U.S. Travel Association estimated that the economic impact of the oil spill on tourism across the Gulf Coast over a three-year period could exceed approximately $23 billion, in a region that supports over 400,000 travel industry jobs generating $34 billion in revenue annually. [265] [266]

Offshore drilling policies Edit

On 30 April 2010, President Barack Obama ordered the federal government to hold the issuing of new offshore drilling leases and authorized the investigation of 29 oil rigs in the Gulf in an effort to determine the cause of the disaster. [267] [268] Later a six-month offshore drilling (below 500 feet (150 m) of water) moratorium was enforced by the United States Department of the Interior. [269] The moratorium suspended work on 33 rigs, [269] and a group of affected companies formed the Back to Work Coalition. [270] On 22 June, a United States federal judge on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana Martin Leach-Cross Feldman when ruling in the case Hornbeck Offshore Services LLC v. Salazar, lifted the moratorium finding it too broad, arbitrary and not adequately justified. [269] The ban was lifted in October 2010.

On 28 April 2010, the National Energy Board of Canada, which regulates offshore drilling in the Canadian Arctic and along the British Columbia Coast, issued a letter to oil companies asking them to explain their argument against safety rules which require same-season relief wells. [271] On 3 May California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger withdrew his support for a proposed plan to allow expanded offshore drilling projects in California. [272] [273] On 8 July, Florida Governor Charlie Crist called for a special session of the state legislature to draft an amendment to the state constitution banning offshore drilling in state waters, which the legislature rejected on 20 July. [274] [275]

In October 2011, the United States Department of the Interior's Minerals Management Service was dissolved after it was determined it had exercised poor oversight over the drilling industry. Three new agencies replaced it, separating the regulation, leasing, and revenue collection responsibilities respectively, among the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, and Office of Natural Resources Revenue.

In March 2014, BP was again allowed to bid for oil and gas leases. [276]

U.S. reactions Edit

On 30 April, President Obama dispatched the Secretaries of the Department of Interior and Homeland Security, as well as the EPA Administrator and NOAA to the Gulf Coast to assess the disaster. [277] In his 15 June speech, Obama said, "This oil spill is the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced. Make no mistake: we will fight this spill with everything we've got for as long as it takes. We will make BP pay for the damage their company has caused. And we will do whatever's necessary to help the Gulf Coast and its people recover from this tragedy." [278] Interior Secretary Ken Salazar stated, "Our job basically is to keep the boot on the neck of British Petroleum." [279] Some observers suggested that the Obama administration was being overly aggressive in its criticisms, which some BP investors saw as an attempt to deflect criticism of his own handling of the crisis. [280] Rand Paul accused President Obama of being anti-business and "un-American". [279]

Public opinion polls in the U.S. were generally critical of the way President Obama and the federal government handled the disaster and they were extremely critical of BPs response. Across the US, thousands participated in dozens of protests at BP gas stations and other locations, [281] [282] [283] reducing sales at some stations by 10% to 40%. [284]

Industry claimed that disasters are infrequent and that this spill was an isolated incident and rejected claims of a loss of industry credibility. [285] The American Petroleum Institute (API) stated that the offshore drilling industry is important to job creation and economic growth. [285] [286] CEOs from the top five oil companies all agreed to work harder at improving safety. API announced the creation of an offshore safety institute, separate from API's lobbying operation. [287]

The Organization for International Investment, a Washington D.C.-based advocate for overseas investment in the United States, warned that the heated rhetoric was potentially damaging the reputation of British companies with operations in the United States and could spark a wave of U.S. protectionism that would restrict British firms from government contracts, political donations and lobbying. [288] [289]

In July 2010, President Obama issued an executive order, specifically citing the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, that adopted recommendations from the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force and established the National Ocean Council. [290] The council called together a number of federal committees and departments engaged in ocean issues to work with a newly established committee for conservation and resource management. [291] In June 2018, the executive order establishing the National Ocean Council was revoked by President Trump in an effort to roll back bureaucracy and benefit "ocean industries [that] employ millions of Americans". [291] [292]

United Kingdom reactions Edit

In the UK, there was anger at the American press and news outlets for the misuse of the term "British Petroleum" for the company – a name which has not been used since British Petroleum merged with the American company Amoco in 1998 to form BP Amoco . It was said that the U.S. was "dumping" the blame onto the British people and there were calls for British Prime Minister David Cameron to protect British interests in the United States. British pension fund managers (who have large holdings of BP shares and rely upon its dividends) accepted that while BP had to pay compensation for the spill and the environmental damage, they argued that the cost to the company's market value from President Obama's criticism was far outweighing the direct clean-up costs. [280]

Initially, BP downplayed the incident its CEO Tony Hayward called the amount of oil and dispersant "relatively tiny" in comparison with the "very big ocean." [293] Later, he drew an outpouring of criticism when he said that the spill was a disruption to Gulf Coast residents and himself adding, "You know, I'd like my life back." [294] BP's chief operating officer Doug Suttles contradicted the underwater plume discussion noting, "It may be down to how you define what a plume is here… The oil that has been found is in very minute quantities." [295] In June, BP launched a PR campaign and successfully bid for several search terms related to the spill on Google and other search engines so that the first sponsored search result linked directly to the company's website. [296] [297] On 26 July 2010, it was announced that CEO Tony Hayward was to resign and would be replaced by Bob Dudley, who is an American citizen and previously worked for Amoco. [298] [299]

Hayward's involvement in Deepwater Horizon has left him a highly controversial public figure. In May 2013, he was honored as a "distinguished leader" by the University of Birmingham, but his award ceremony was stopped on multiple occasions by jeers and walk-outs and the focus of a protest from People & Planet members. [300]

In July 2013, Hayward was awarded an honorary degree from Robert Gordon University. This was described as "a very serious error of judgement" by Friends of the Earth Scotland, and "a sick joke" by the university's student president. [301]

International reactions Edit

The U.S. government rejected offers of cleanup help from Canada, Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations. The U.S. State Department listed 70 assistance offers from 23 countries, all being initially declined, but later, 8 had been accepted. [302] [303] The USCG actively requested skimming boats and equipment from several countries. [304]

Investigations Edit

In the United States the Deepwater Horizon investigation included several investigations and commissions, including reports by the USCG National Incident Commander, Admiral Thad Allen, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), National Academy of Engineering, National Research Council, Government Accountability Office, National Oil Spill Commission, and Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. [60] The Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator conducted a separate investigation on the marine casualty. [2] BP conducted its internal investigation.

An investigation of the possible causes of the explosion was launched on 22 April 2010 by the USCG and the Minerals Management Service. [37] On 11 May the United States administration requested the National Academy of Engineering conduct an independent technical investigation. [305] The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling was established on 22 May to "consider the root causes of the disaster and offer options on safety and environmental precautions." [306] The investigation by United States Attorney General Eric Holder was announced on 1 June 2010. [307] Also the United States House Committee on Energy and Commerce conducted a number of hearings, including hearings of Tony Hayward and heads of Anadarko and Mitsui's exploration unit. [81] [308] According to the US Congressional investigation, the rig's blowout preventer, built by Cameron International Corporation, had a hydraulic leak and a failed battery, and therefore failed. [309]

On 8 September 2010, BP released a 193-page report on its web site. The report places some of the blame for the accident on BP but also on Halliburton and Transocean. [310] The report found that on 20 April 2010, managers misread pressure data and gave their approval for rig workers to replace drilling fluid in the well with seawater, which was not heavy enough to prevent gas that had been leaking into the well from firing up the pipe to the rig, causing the explosion. The conclusion was that BP was partly to blame, as was Transocean, which owned the rig. Responding to the report, Transocean and Halliburton placed all blame on BP. [311]

On 9 November 2010, a report by the Oil Spill Commission said that there had been "a rush to completion" on the well and criticised poor management decisions. "There was not a culture of safety on that rig," the co-chair said. [312]

The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling released a final report on 5 January 2011. [313] [314] The panel found that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean had attempted to work more cheaply and thus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakage. [315] The report stated that "whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money)." [315] BP released a statement in response to this, saying, that "even prior to the conclusion of the commission's investigation, BP instituted significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk management." [316] Transocean, however, blamed BP for making the decisions before the actual explosion occurred and government officials for permitting those decisions. [317] Halliburton stated that it was acting only upon the orders of BP when it injected the cement into the wall of the well. [316] [318] It criticized BP for its failure to run a cement bond log test. [317] In the report, BP was accused of nine faults. [316] [318] One was that it had not used a diagnostic tool to test the strength of the cement. [315] Another was ignoring a pressure test that had failed. [316] Still another was for not plugging the pipe with cement. [315] The study did not, however, place the blame on any one of these events. Rather, it concluded that "notwithstanding these inherent risks, the accident of April 20 was avoidable" and that "it resulted from clear mistakes made in the first instance by BP, Halliburton and Transocean, and by government officials who, relying too much on industry's assertions of the safety of their operations, failed to create and apply a program of regulatory oversight that would have properly minimized the risk of deepwater drilling." [316] [318] The panel also noted that the government regulators did not have sufficient knowledge or authority to notice these cost-cutting decisions. [315]

On 23 March 2011, BOEMRE (former MMS) and the USCG published a forensic examination report on the blowout preventer, prepared by Det Norske Veritas. [319] The report concluded that the primary cause of failure was that the blind shear rams failed to fully close and seal due to a portion of drill pipe buckling between the shearing blocks.

The US government report issued in September 2011 stated that BP is ultimately responsible for the spill, and that Halliburton and Transocean share some of the blame. [21] [320] The report states that the main cause was the defective cement job, and Halliburton, BP and Transocean were, in different ways, responsible for the accident. [21] The report stated that, although the events leading to the sinking of Deepwater Horizon were set into motion by the failure to prevent a well blowout, the investigation revealed numerous systems deficiencies, and acts and omissions by Transocean and its Deepwater Horizon crew, that had an adverse impact on the ability to prevent or limit the magnitude of the disaster. The report also states that a central cause of the blowout was failure of a cement barrier allowing hydrocarbons to flow up the wellbore, through the riser and onto the rig, resulting in the blowout. The loss of life and the subsequent pollution of the Gulf of Mexico were the result of poor risk management, last‐minute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to critical indicators, inadequate well control response, and insufficient emergency bridge response training by companies and individuals responsible for drilling at the Macondo well and for the operation of the drilling platform. [21]

Spill response fund Edit

On 16 June 2010, after BP executives met with President Obama, BP announced and established the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), a $20 billion fund to settle claims arising from the Deepwater Horizon spill. [81] [321] This fund was set aside for natural resource damages, state and local response costs, and individual compensation, but could not be used for fines or penalties. [81] Prior to establishing the GCCF, emergency compensation was paid by BP from an initial facility. [322]

The GCCF was administrated by attorney Kenneth Feinberg. The facility began accepting claims on 23 August 2010. [321] On 8 March 2012, after BP and a team of plaintiffs' attorneys agreed to a class-action settlement, a court-supervised administrator Patrick Juneau took over administration. [323] [324] Until this more than one million claims of 220,000 individual and business claimants were processed and more than $6.2 billion was paid out from the fund. 97% of payments were made to claimants in the Gulf States. [322] In June 2012, the settlement of claims through the GCCF was replaced by the court-supervised settlement program. During this transition period additional $404 million in claims were paid. [325]

The GCCF and its administrator Feinberg had been criticized about the amount and speed of payments as well as a lack of transparency. [326] An independent audit of the GCCF, announced by Attorney General Eric Holder, was approved by Senate on 21 October 2011. [327] An auditor BDO Consulting found that 7,300 claimants were wrongly denied or underpaid. As a result, about $64 million of additional payments was made. [323] The Mississippi Center for Justice provided pro bono assistance to 10,000 people to help them "navigate the complex claims process." In a New York Times opinion piece, Stephen Teague, staff attorney at the Mississippi Center for Justice, argued that BP had become "increasingly brazen" in "stonewalling payments." "But tens of thousands of gulf residents still haven't been fully compensated for their losses, and many are struggling to make ends meet. Many low-wage workers in the fishing and service industries, for example, have been seeking compensation for lost wages and jobs for three years." [328]

In July 2013, BP made a motion in court to freeze payments on tens of thousands of claims, arguing inter alia that a staff attorney from the Deepwater Horizon Court-Supervised Settlement Program, the program responsible for evaluating compensation claims, had improperly profited from claims filed by a New Orleans law firm. The attorney is said to have received portions of settlement claims for clients he referred to the firm. [328] The federal judge assigned to the case, Judge Barbier, refused to halt the settlement program, saying he had not seen evidence of widespread fraud, adding that he was "offended by what he saw as attempts to smear the lawyer administering the claims." [329]

Civil litigation and settlements Edit

By 26 May 2010, over 130 lawsuits relating to the spill had been filed [330] against one or more of BP, Transocean, Cameron International Corporation, and Halliburton Energy Services, [331] although it was considered likely by observers that these would be combined into one court as a multidistrict litigation. [331] On 21 April 2011, BP issued $40 billion worth of lawsuits against rig owner Transocean, cementer Halliburton and blowout preventer manufacturer Cameron. The oil firm alleged failed safety systems and irresponsible behaviour of contractors had led to the explosion, including claims that Halliburton failed to properly use modelling software to analyze safe drilling conditions. [332] The firms deny the allegations.

On 2 March 2012, BP and plaintiffs agreed to settle their lawsuits. The deal would settle roughly 100,000 claims filed by individuals and businesses affected by the spill. [333] [334] On 13 August, BP asked US District Judge Carl Barbier to approve the settlement, saying its actions "did not constitute gross negligence or willful misconduct". [335] On 13 January 2013, Judge Barbier approved a medical-benefits portion of BP's proposed $7.8 billion partial settlement. People living for at least 60 days along oil-impacted shores or involved in the clean-up who can document one or more specific health conditions caused by the oil or dispersants are eligible for benefits, as are those injured during clean-up. [336] BP also agreed to spend $105 million over five years to set up a Gulf Coast health outreach program and pay for medical examinations. [46] According to a group presenting the plaintiffs, the deal has no specific cap. [337] BP says that it has $9.5 billion in assets set aside in a trust to pay the claims, and the settlement will not increase the $37.2 billion the company budgeted for spill-related expenses. [333] BP originally expected to spend $7.8 billion. By October 2013 it had increased its projection to $9.2 billion, saying it could be "significantly higher." [338]

On 31 August 2012, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) filed papers in federal court in New Orleans blaming BP for the Gulf oil spill, describing the spill as an example of "gross negligence and willful misconduct." In their statement the DOJ said that some of BP's arguments were "plainly misleading" and that the court should ignore BP's argument that the Gulf region is "undergoing a robust recovery". BP rejected the charges saying "BP believes it was not grossly negligent and looks forward to presenting evidence on this issue at trial in January." [339] [340] The DOJ also said Transocean, the owner and operator of the Deepwater Horizon rig, was guilty of gross negligence as well. [339] [341]

On 14 November 2012, BP and the US Department of Justice reached a settlement. BP will pay $4.5 billion in fines and other payments, the largest of its kind in US history. In addition, the U.S. government temporarily banned BP from new federal contracts over its "lack of business integrity". [342] [343] The plea was accepted by Judge Sarah Vance of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on 31 January 2013. [344] The settlement includes payments of $2.394 billion to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, $1.15 billion to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, $350 million to the National Academy of Sciences for oil spill prevention and response research, $100 million to the North America Wetland Conservation Fund, $6 million to General Treasury and $525 million to the Securities and Exchange Commission. [24] [60] Oil sector analysts at London-based investment bank Canaccord Genuity noted that a settlement along the lines disclosed would only be a partial resolution of the many claims against BP. [345]

On 3 January 2013, the US Justice Department announced "Transocean Deepwater Inc. has agreed to plead guilty to violating the Clean Water Act and to pay a total of $1.4 billion in civil and criminal fines and penalties". [346] $800 million goes to Gulf Coast restoration Trust Fund, $300 million to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, $150 million to the National Wild Turkey Federation and $150 million to the National Academy of Sciences. MOEX Offshore 2007 agreed to pay $45 million to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, $25 million to five Gulf state and $20 million to supplemental environmental projects. [60]

On 25 July 2013, Halliburton pleaded guilty to destruction of critical evidence after the oil spill and said it would pay the maximum allowable fine of $200,000 and will be subject to three years of probation. [347]

In January 2014, a panel of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an effort by BP to curb payment of what it described as "fictitious" and "absurd" claims to a settlement fund for businesses and persons affected by the oil spill. BP said administration of the 2012 settlement was marred by the fact that people without actual damages could file a claim. The court ruled that BP hadn't explained "how this court or the district court should identify or even discern the existence of 'claimants that have suffered no cognizable injury.'" [338] The Court then went further, calling BP's position "nonsensical." [348] [349] The Supreme Court of the United States later refused to hear BP's appeal after victims and claimants, along with numerous Gulf coast area chambers of commerce, objected to the oil major's efforts to renege on the Settlement Agreement. [350]

In September 2014, Halliburton agreed to settle a large percentage of legal claims against it by paying $1.1 billion into a trust by way of three installments over two years. [351]

Justice Department lawsuit Edit

BP and its partners in the oil well, Transocean and Halliburton, went on trial on 25 February 2013 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in New Orleans to determine payouts and fines under the Clean Water Act and the Natural Resources Damage Assessment. The plaintiffs included the U.S. Justice Department, Gulf states and private individuals. Tens of billions of dollars in liability and fines were at stake. A finding of gross negligence would result in a four-fold increase in the fines BP would have to pay for violating the federal Clean Water Act, and leave the company liable for punitive damages for private claims. [352]

The trial's first phase was to determine the liability of BP, Transocean, Halliburton, and other companies, and if they acted with gross negligence and willful misconduct. [353] [354] The second phase scheduled in September 2013 focused on the flow rate of the oil and the third phase scheduled in 2014 was to consider damages. [355] According to the plaintiffs' lawyers the major cause of an explosion was the mishandling of a rig safety test, while inadequate training of the staff, poor maintenance of the equipment and substandard cement were also mentioned as things leading to the disaster. [354] [355] According to The Wall Street Journal the U.S. government and Gulf Coast states had prepared an offer to BP for a $16 billion settlement. However, it was not clear if this deal had been officially proposed to BP and if BP has accepted it. [356]

On 4 September 2014, U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier ruled BP was guilty of gross negligence and willful misconduct. He described BP's actions as "reckless." He said Transocean's and Halliburton's actions were "negligent." He apportioned 67% of the blame for the spill to BP, 30% to Transocean, and 3% to Halliburton. Fines would be apportioned commensurate with the degree of negligence of the parties, measured against the number of barrels of oil spilled. Under the Clean Water Act fines can be based on a cost per barrel of up to $4,300, at the discretion of the judge. The number of barrels was in dispute at the conclusion of the trial with BP arguing 2.5 million barrels were spilled over the 87 days the spill lasted, while the court contends 4.2 million barrels were spilled. BP issued a statement strongly disagreeing with the finding, and saying the court's decision would be appealed. [357]

Barbier ruled that BP had acted with “conscious disregard of known risks" and rejected BP's assertion that other parties were equally responsible for the oil spill. His ruling stated that BP "employees took risks that led to the largest environmental disaster in U.S. history", that the company was "reckless", and determined that several crucial BP decisions were "primarily driven by a desire to save time and money, rather than ensuring that the well was secure." BP strongly disagreed with the ruling and filed an immediate appeal. [29] [358]

On 2 July 2015, BP, the U.S. Justice Department and five gulf states announced that the company agreed to pay a record settlement of $18.7 billion. [359] To date BP's cost for the clean-up, environmental and economic damages and penalties has reached $54 billion. [360]

Criminal charges Edit

In addition to the private lawsuits and civil governmental actions, the federal government charged multiple companies and five individuals with federal crimes.

In the November 2012 resolution of the federal charges against it, BP agreed to plead guilty to 11 felony counts related to the deaths of the 11 workers and paid a $4 billion fine. [24] Transocean pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge as part of its $1.4 billion fine.

In April 2012, the Justice Department filed the first criminal charge against Kurt Mix, a BP engineer, for obstructing justice by deleting messages showing that BP knew the flow rate was three times higher than initial claims by the company, and knew that "Top Kill" was unlikely to succeed, but claimed otherwise. [361] [362] [363] Three more BP employees were charged in November 2012. Site managers Donald Vidrine and Robert Kaluza were charged with manslaughter for acting negligently in their supervision of key safety tests performed on the rig prior to the explosion, and failure to alert onshore engineers of problems in the drilling operation. [364] David Rainey, BP's former vice-president for exploration in the Gulf of Mexico, was charged with obstructing Congress by misrepresenting the rate that oil was flowing out of the well. [365] Lastly, Anthony Badalamenti, a Halliburton manager, was charged with instructing two employees to delete data related to Halliburton's cementing job on the oil well. [366]

None of the charges against individuals resulted in any prison time, and no charges were levied against upper level executives. Anthony Badalementi was sentenced to one year probation, [366] Donald Vidrine paid a $50,000 fine and received 10 months probation, [367] Kurt Mix received 6 months' probation, [368] and David Rainey and Robert Kaluza were acquitted. [367] [368]

A 14-year-long oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico verges on becoming one of the worst in U.S. history

NEW ORLEANS — An oil spill that has been quietly leaking millions of barrels into the Gulf of Mexico has gone unplugged for so long that it now verges on becoming one of the worst offshore disasters in U.S. history.

Between 300 and 700 barrels of oil per day have been spewing from a site 12 miles off the Louisiana coast since 2004, when an oil-production platform owned by Taylor Energy sank in a mudslide triggered by Hurricane Ivan. Many of the wells have not been capped, and federal officials estimate that the spill could continue through this century. With no fix in sight, the Taylor offshore spill is threatening to overtake BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster as the largest ever.

As oil continues to spoil the Gulf, the Trump administration is proposing the largest expansion of leases for the oil and gas industry, with the potential to open nearly the entire outer continental shelf to offshore drilling. That includes the Atlantic coast, where drilling hasn’t happened in more than a half century and where hurricanes hit with double the regularity of the Gulf.

Expansion plans come despite fears that the offshore oil industry is poorly regulated and that the planet needs to decrease fossil fuels to combat climate change, as well as the knowledge that 14 years after Ivan took down Taylor’s platform, the broken wells are releasing so much oil that researchers needed respirators to study the damage.

“I don’t think people know that we have this ocean in the United States that’s filled with industry,” said Scott Eustis, an ecologist for the Gulf Restoration Network, as a six-seat plane circled the spill site on a flyover last summer. On the horizon, a forest of oil platforms rose up from the Gulf’s waters, and all that is left of the doomed Taylor platform are rainbow-colored oil slicks that are often visible for miles. He cannot imagine similar development in the Atlantic, where the majority of coastal state governors, lawmakers, attorneys general and residents have aligned against the administration’s proposal.

The Taylor Energy spill is largely unknown outside Louisiana because of the company’s effort to keep it secret in the hopes of protecting its reputation and proprietary information about its operations, according to a lawsuit that eventually forced the company to reveal its cleanup plan. The spill was hidden for six years before environmental watchdog groups stumbled on oil slicks while monitoring the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster a few miles north of the Taylor site in 2010.

The Interior Department is fighting an effort by Taylor Energy to walk away from the disaster. The company sued Interior in federal court, seeking the return of about $450 million left in a trust it established with the government to fund its work to recover part of the wreckage and locate wells buried under 100 feet of muck.

Looking Ahead

NOAA’s work restoring the Gulf will continue past 2030. We will lead the implementation and monitoring of numerous large restoration projects, evaluate restoration effectiveness, and make corrective actions as needed. NOAA is using lessons from the Deepwater Horizon spill and subsequent research to be even better prepared to provide expert scientific support during other oil spills. These lessons, and our continued scientific support, will ensure restoration provides sustained benefits to natural resources and communities in the Gulf.


The International Hydrographic Organization defines the southeast limit of the Gulf of Mexico as: [6]

The consensus among geologists [3] [7] [8] who have studied the geology of the Gulf of Mexico is that before the Late Triassic, the Gulf of Mexico did not exist. Before the Late Triassic, the area now occupied by the Gulf of Mexico consisted of dry land, which included continental crust that now underlies Yucatán, within the middle of the large supercontinent of Pangea. This land lay south of a continuous mountain range that extended from north-central Mexico, through the Marathon Uplift in West Texas and the Ouachita Mountains of Oklahoma, and to Alabama where it linked directly to the Appalachian Mountains. It was created by the collision of continental plates that formed Pangea. As interpreted by Roy Van Arsdale and Randel T. Cox, this mountain range was breached in Late Cretaceous times by the formation of the Mississippi Embayment. [9] [10]

Geologists and other Earth scientists agree in general that the present Gulf of Mexico basin originated in Late Triassic time as the result of rifting within Pangea. [11] The rifting was associated with zones of weakness within Pangea, including sutures where the Laurentia, South American, and African plates collided to create it. First, there was a Late Triassic-Early Jurassic phase of rifting during which rift valleys formed and filled with continental red beds. Second, as rifting progressed through Early and Middle Jurassic times, the continental crust was stretched and thinned. This thinning created a broad zone of transitional crust, which displays modest and uneven thinning with block faulting, and a broad zone of uniformly thinned transitional crust, which is half the typical 40-kilometer (25 mi) thickness of normal continental crust. It was at this time that rifting first created a connection to the Pacific Ocean across central Mexico and later eastward to the Atlantic Ocean. This flooded the opening basin to create the Gulf of Mexico as an enclosed marginal sea. While the Gulf of Mexico was a restricted basin, the subsiding transitional crust was blanketed by the widespread deposition of Louann Salt and associated anhydrite evaporites. During the Late Jurassic, continued rifting widened the Gulf of Mexico and progressed to the point that sea-floor spreading and formation of oceanic crust occurred. At this point, sufficient circulation with the Atlantic Ocean was established that the deposition of Louann Salt ceased. [7] [8] [12] [13] Seafloor spreading stopped at the end of Jurassic time, about 145–150 million years ago.

During the Late Jurassic through Early Cretaceous, the basin occupied by the Gulf of Mexico experienced a period of cooling and subsidence of the crust underlying it. The subsidence was the result of a combination of crustal stretching, cooling, and loading. Initially, the combination of crustal stretching and cooling caused about 5–7 km (3.1–4.3 mi) of tectonic subsidence of the central thin transitional and oceanic crust. Because subsidence occurred faster than sediment could fill it, the Gulf of Mexico expanded and deepened. [7] [13] [14]

Later, loading of the crust within the Gulf of Mexico and adjacent coastal plain by the accumulation of kilometers of sediments during the rest of the Mesozoic and all of the Cenozoic further depressed the underlying crust to its current position about 10–20 km (6.2–12.4 mi) below sea level. Particularly during the Cenozoic, thick clastic wedges built out the continental shelf along the northwestern and northern margins of the Gulf of Mexico. [7] [13] [14]

To the east, the stable Florida platform was not covered by the sea until the latest Jurassic or the beginning of Cretaceous time. The Yucatán platform was emergent until the mid-Cretaceous. After both platforms were submerged, the formation of carbonates and evaporites has characterized the geologic history of these two stable areas. Most of the basin was rimmed during the Early Cretaceous by carbonate platforms, and its western flank was involved during the latest Cretaceous and early Paleogene periods in a compressive deformation episode, the Laramide Orogeny, which created the Sierra Madre Oriental of eastern Mexico. [15]

In 2002 geologist Michael Stanton published a speculative essay suggesting an impact origin for the Gulf of Mexico at the close of the Permian, which could have caused the Permian–Triassic extinction event. [16] However, Gulf Coast geologists do not regard this hypothesis as having any credibility. Instead they overwhelmingly accept plate tectonics, not an asteroid impact, as having created the Gulf of Mexico as illustrated by papers authored by Kevin Mickus and others. [3] [8] [13] [17] This hypothesis is not to be confused with the Chicxulub Crater, a large impact crater on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico on the Yucatán Peninsula. Increasingly, the Gulf of Mexico is regarded as a back-arc basin behind the Jurassic Nazas Arc of Mexico. [18]

In 2014 Erik Cordes of Temple University and others discovered a brine pool 3,300 feet (1,000 m) below the gulf's surface, with a circumference of 100 feet (30 m) and 12 feet (3.7 m) feet deep, which is four to five times saltier than the rest of the water. The first exploration of the site was unmanned, using Hercules and in 2015 a team of three used the deep submergence vehicle Alvin. The site cannot sustain any kind of life other than bacteria, mussels with a symbiotic relationship, tube worms and certain kinds of shrimp. It has been called the "Jacuzzi of Despair". Because it is warmer than the surrounding water (65 °F or 18 °C compared to 39 °F or 4 °C), animals are attracted to it, but cannot survive once they enter it. [19]

Today, the Gulf of Mexico has the following seven main areas: [15]

    , which contains the Sigsbee Deep and can be further divided into the continental rise, the Sigsbee Abyssal Plain, and the Mississippi Cone. , which extends from a point east of the Mississippi River Delta near Biloxi to the eastern side of Apalachee Bay. , which extends along the coast from Apalachee Bay to the Straits of Florida and includes the Florida Keys and Dry Tortugas , which extends from the Yucatán Straits in the east to the Tabasco–Campeche Basin in the west and includes Arrecife Alacran. , which is an isthmian embayment extending from the western edge of Campeche Bank to the offshore regions just east of the port of Veracruz. , which is located between Veracruz to the south and the Rio Grande to the north. , which extends from Alabama to the Rio Grande.

Pre-Columbian Edit

As early as the Maya Civilization, the Gulf of Mexico was used as a trade route off the coast of the Yucatán Peninsula and present-day Veracruz.

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