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10 September 1943
German troops occupy Rome
British 8th Army captures Taranto
Italian troops in northern Italy surrender to the Germans
Greek troops land on the Dodecanese islands.
Walsch, Neale Donald
American author of "Conversations With God, an Uncommon Dialogue," G.P. Putnam's sons, NY 1996. He says that the book "happened" to him in the spring of 1992. In angst over why his life was not working, he began talking to God and the answers came in automatic writing, as he took dictation. As he completed the book in February 1993, he was told specifically that three books would be produced through him, answering questions about life and love, purpose and function - everything. His trilogy has sold more than five million copies by 2001. "Friendship With God" was published in October 1999 and within weeks became a New York bestseller.
Walsch was the youngest of three sons born to an insurance salesman who died in 1990 and a homemaker who died in 1972. His dad discouraged Neale's ambition to become a priest and took a axe to the boy's treasured piano because it took up too much room. His unsympathetic upbringing led Neale to a series of unstable relationships and career problems. By the time he settled down with his fourth wife, Nancy Fleming, a registered nurse, in 1994, he had produced nine kids. (Another article states six marriages) Before his 1992 epiphany, he rotated jobs as a radio talk show host, journalist and publicist. At one time he was homeless for two months, living on a campground.
Walsch lives with his wife Nancy at their retreat, ReCreation, with a 15-member staff in Medford, the woodlands of southern Oregon. At his conferences, people pay up to as much as $725 to hear him speak. Their goal is to give people back to themselves, as they continually tour, answering questions, host workshops and spread the message of his book in which he has God's own word that there is no such thing as good and evil - it's all a matter of "group consciousness," and there is no hell. But there is a heaven that accepts everyone. He presents an appropriate image of the prophet, a large, handsome man with a neatly shaped gray beard.
The Teague Chronicle (Teague, Tex.), Vol. 37, No. 10, Ed. 1 Thursday, September 30, 1943
Weekly newspaper from Teague, Texas that includes local, state, and national news along with advertising.
eight pages : ill. page 23 x 17 in. Digitized from 35 mm. microfilm.
This newspaper is part of the collection entitled: Freestone County Area Newspaper Collection and was provided by the Fairfield Library to The Portal to Texas History, a digital repository hosted by the UNT Libraries. It has been viewed 27 times. More information about this issue can be viewed below.
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The Fairfield Library first opened its doors August 2, 1954, in a small brick house on the Courthouse square with just 224 books. By 1977, the growing library gained accreditation in the Texas Library System and subsequently became a place where families could spend time together reading and enjoying the abundant resources.
This Day in Hockey History – September 10, 1943 – Toronto’s Teeder Totter
During the early 1940s, Toronto and Montreal played catch, tossing two young players between them. The game ended on September 10, 1943 with Frank Eddolls going to the Canadiens in return for the Maple Leafs keeping Ted “Teeder” Kennedy. It has been called the best trade Toronto ever made, from which they created a dynasty.
Kennedy was born in Humberstone, Ontario, less than two weeks after his father died in a hunting accident. His mother worked at the local hockey arena, where he spent most of his time. From at least the age of 7, when he first saw No. 9 Charlie Conacher, Kennedy was a Maple Leafs fan. He later said, “It was a boyhood dream to play for Toronto.”
However, the first NHL team to show interest was Montreal. In 1942, they invited the 16-year-old to the training camp for their junior team, the Montreal Royals. The scout assured Kennedy’s mother that they would be paying for him to attend Montreal’s prestigious Lower Canada College. From the moment he arrived without anyone from the team to greet him or assist him, Kennedy had bad feelings about continuing with the team. After three weeks, Kennedy grew homesick enough to head home.
Back in Ontario, Kennedy played for the Port Colborne Sailors senior team. Their coach was none other than Nels Stewart, a record-setting NHL goal-scorer (who would be inducted into the Hockey Hall of Fame in 1952). As the season ended in February 1943, a scout negotiated with Kennedy to sign a contract with the Montreal Canadiens. Kennedy declined, explaining, “It wasn’t a bluff for more money, I simply had no intention of going to Montreal.” The scout warned that the only way to turn pro was with the Canadiens.
Meanwhile, Stewart had other ideas, considering Kennedy “a coming great.” He told the Maple Leafs about his protégé and got him a meeting. On February 28, Kennedy traveled to Toronto, was met at the train station, and by that evening, signed a contract with interim GM Frank Selke. As the youngest player ever to dress for the team, he debuted with the Maple Leafs on March 7 and impressed all of the coaches.
As Kennedy was still “officially” owned by the Canadiens, Toronto had to make a trade to obtain clear rights. Once that was done on September 10, Kennedy spent his inaugural season with the Leafs in 1943-44. Coach Hap Day said at the time, “We know we are giving up a strong defence player to deal with Kennedy, but we won’t be shy of defence material after the war and we do need attack strength now.” Selke said much the same. “We are taking a gamble. We think Kennedy is a coming star.”
On the other end of the trade, Eddolls was actually returning to Montreal. The defenseman grew up in Lachine, Quebec and had an arrangement with the Canadiens while playing in juniors. After his Oshawa Generals won the 1940 Memorial Cup, the Maples Leafs wanted to sign him. On June 7, 1940, Montreal traded Eddolls’s rights to Toronto in return for the rights to Joe Benoit. The following year, Eddolls began playing for the AHL Hershey Bears, but he soon left for military service. The trade happened while he was serving, so he returned home to find himself at the Canadiens’ training camp.
Eddolls remained with the Habs for three partial seasons, winning the Stanley Cup in 1946. He was traded to the New York Rangers in August 1947 and finished out his NHL career there in 1952. On October 8, 1952, Eddolls was actually sold back to Montreal, to serve as playing coach of the AHL Buffalo Bisons. Eddolls had one last NHL hurrah, as coach to the Chicago Blackhawks for the 1954-55 season.
Though the trade has widely been praised as one of Toronto’s best, it came at the cost of a schism in management. At the time, Selke was only covering for GM Conn Smythe, who was serving overseas during the war. As Selke himself said (in 1962), “I told Dick Irvin that the Maple Leafs were desperate for bodies to fill the lineup, and that we could give up the rights to [Frank] Eddolls for the rights to Ted Kennedy. After weeks of negotiation and a lot of hesitation, Gorman and Irvin finally consented to make the trade. Fearing they might change their minds … Happy Day and I completed the transfer of Eddolls to Montreal without taking the time to consult Smythe … [We] received a cable from France ordering us to cancel the deal. It was ignored, and Ted Kennedy developed into as effective a hockey player as the Maple Leafs ever owned. But the deal spelled finis to my usefulness as an assistant to Conn Smythe.”
Smythe was so furious when he returned, in 1946 Selke decided to go to Montreal himself. During Selke’s 18 years managing the Canadiens, they beat Toronto’s dynasty by winning five consecutive championships. Meanwhile, back in Toronto, Smythe ended up praising Kennedy as the “greatest competitor in hockey.”
Kennedy had a Hall-of-Fame career in which he only ever played for Toronto, leading to him being called the “quintessential Maple Leaf.” Coach Day made him into the best faceoff man in the league and earned a reputation for making important goals during playoffs. The Leafs won five championships during his first seven seasons, including three consecutively. Having become captain in 1948, he accepted the Stanley Cup on the third win by telling the crowd, “We must have been an awful strain on you because there were times when even we didn’t think we were going to get into the playoffs. But here we are – and there’s the Cup.” At the end of his career, as something of a lifetime acknowledgement, in 1955 he was awarded the Hart Trophy as league MVP. After a brief return to assist his struggling team, Kennedy retired for good in 1957.
Having worn No. 9 throughout his junior career, Kennedy finally received the prized number in the NHL at the start of the 1946-47 season, when Conacher himself presented the number to him. Thus began Toronto’s tradition of having a player pass down his number to another great player. In 1993, the Leafs retired No. 9 for Kennedy and No. 10 for Syl Apps. Kennedy was inducted into the Hockey Hall of Fame in 1966.
10 key Second World War dates you need to know
The Second World War started on 1 September 1939 and ended on 2 September 1945. But what are the other key dates from those decades that marked the conflict? From epic battles to atomic bombs, Professor Jeremy Black rounds up 10 of the most significant WW2 dates.
This competition is now closed
Published: August 28, 2019 at 11:00 am
7 July 1937: Clash near the Marco Polo Bridge, close to Beijing
The triggering of the full-scale war with China that lasted until 1945 began with an obscure clash involving a Japanese unit on night manoeuvres near the Marco Polo Bridge southwest of Beijing on the night of 7–8 July 1937. The Japanese felt the nation’s honour had been challenged and sent fresh forces to the region. Hardliners in the Japanese army used the incident to press for a settlement of China on their terms, while the Chinese nationalist leader, Jiang Jieshi, was unwilling to propriate Japan. As a result, an intractable struggle began that greatly weakened both sides. Large-scale conflict broke out toward the end of July, and Beijing was occupied on 29 July.
10 May 1940: Germans launch offensive in the West
The German unwillingness to limit their war to the conquest of Poland and to launch meaningful peace talks meant that the Second World War broadened out. Hitler was eager to profit from the ability Poland’s defeat offered for Germany to fight on only one front and argued that Germany enjoyed a window of opportunity thanks to being more prepared for war than Britain or France.
Bad weather in the severe winter of 1939–40, caution on the part of the German High Command, and the need for preparations, delayed the attack until May 1940. On 10 May, the Germans attacked Belgium and the Netherlands, both hitherto neutral, and invaded France. They successfully gained and used the initiative, while the French and British suffered from a failure to prepare for fluid defence in depth.
Germany’s success in its subsequent seven-week campaign transformed the strategic situation in Europe. Victory led Hitler to a conviction of his own ineluctable success, and that of the Wehrmacht under his leadership. Thanks to this victory, the Germans would clearly be able to fight on, and any successful challenge to them would now have to overcome German dominance of Western Europe.
12 August 1940: Battle of Britain begins
The first concerted attack on British airfields was launched on 12 August 1940. The fall of France ensured that German airbases were now close to Britain. The Luftwaffe (German air force) was instructed to help prepare the way for invasion by driving British warships from the Channel. However, Luftwaffe commanders were increasingly concerned to attack the RAF and its supporting infrastructure in order to prepare the way for reducing Britain to submission by a bombing war on civilian targets – a strategy that would put the Luftwaffe centre-stage.
The first major military campaign in history to be fought entirely in the air, the Battle of Britain saw the Luftwaffe launch a large-scale attack against Britain’s air defences. Yet by October 1940, the RAF was victorious. The lack of clarity in the relationship between air attack and invasion affected German strategy, but there was also a lack of preparation for a strategic air offensive, notably in aircraft, pilots, tactics and doctrine. British fighting quality proved a key element in the German defeat, as did the support provided by radar and the ground-control organisation.
22 June 1941: Launching of Operation Barbarossa
Hitler’s overconfidence and contempt for other political systems reinforced his belief that Germany had to conquer the Soviet Union in order to fulfill her destiny and obtain Lebensraum (living space). He was convinced that a clash with Communism was inevitable, and was concerned about Stalin’s intentions. Hitler was confident that the Soviet system would collapse rapidly, and he was happy to accept misleading intelligence assessments of the size and mobilisation potential of the Red Army. He believed that the defeat of the Soviet Union would make Britain ready to settle and to accept German dominance of Europe.
On 22 June, 151 German divisions, supported by 14 Finnish and 13 Romanian divisions – nearly 3.6 million German and allied troops, backed by 3,350 tanks and 1,950 aircraft – were launched in a surprise attack. There was no realistic political plan to accompany the strategy. The failure to knock the Soviet Union out that year left the Germans involved in an intractable struggle that was to lead to eventual defeat
7 December 1941: Attack on Pearl Harbor
The Japanese attack on the United States meant the conflict was clearly a world war. Japan could have restricted itself to attacking the British and Dutch colonies in South-East Asia, but, instead chose to also attack America in order to prevent it from opposing Japanese expansion. This led to a surprise attack on the base of the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu in the Hawaiian archipelago.
The Japanese planned to wreck the American Pacific Fleet. It was a classic case of an operational-tactical success, but a strategic failure. Some 353 aircraft from six Japanese carriers totally destroyed two American battleships and damaged five more, while, in an attack on the naval air station at Kaneohe Bay, nearly 300 American aircraft were destroyed or damaged on the ground.
The attack, however, revealed grave deficiencies in Japanese (and American) planning, as well as in the Japanese war machine. Only 45 per cent of naval air requirements had been met by the start of the war, and the last torpedoes employed in the attack were delivered only two days before the fleet sailed.
The damage to America’s battleships (some of which were salvaged and used anew) forced an important shift in American naval planning toward an emphasis on their carriers, the Lexington, the Yorktown and the Enterprise, which, despite Japanese expectations, were not in Pearl Harbor when it was attacked.
No attack on this scale was to be launched on any other fleet during the war. Because of the focus on destroying warships rather than strategic assets, there was no third-wave attack on the fuel and other harbour installations. Had the oil farms (stores) been destroyed, the Pacific Fleet would probably have had to fall back to its Californian base at San Diego, gravely hindering American operations in the Pacific.
Furthermore, the course of the war was to reveal that the strategic concepts that underlay the Japanese plan had been gravely flawed. Aside from underrating American economic strength and the resolve of its people, the Japanese had embarked on an attack that was not essential. Their fleet was larger than the American Pacific and Asiatic Fleets especially in carriers, battleships and cruisers, and the American fleets, as a result, were not in a position to have prevented the Japanese from overrunning British and Dutch colonies, which was their major expansionist goal.
Possible controversy over the lack of the necessary American preparedness at Pearl Harbor was largely put aside in response to the shock of the Japanese surprise attack. The devastating nature of the incident encouraged a rallying round the American government.
4 June 1942: Battle of Midway
The continued capacity of the American navy, however, was shown clearly, on 4 June, with the American victory in the battle of Midway, a naval-air battle of unprecedented scale. This battle also reflected the superiority of American repair efforts and intelligence. So also did the combination of fighter support with carriers (in defence) and of fighters and bombers (in attack) was crucial.
The Americans encountered serious problems in the battle, and contingency and chance played a major role in it, but at Midway and, increasingly, more generally, the Americans handled the uncertainty of war far better than the Japanese. The Japanese navy, which had doctored its war games for Midway, was affected by the tension between two goals: those of decisive naval battle and of the capture of Midway Island. This ensured that the Japanese had to decide whether to prepare their aircraft for land or ship targets – an issue that caused crucial delay during the battle.
While the American ability to learn hard-won lessons from the earlier battle of the Coral Sea (4–8 May 1942) was highly significant, the dependence of operations on tactical adroitness and chance played a major role in a battle in which the ability to locate the target was crucial. An American strike from the Hornet aircraft carrier failed with the fighters and dive-bombers unable to locate the Japanese carriers. Lacking any, or adequate, fighter support, torpedo-bomber attacks suffered very heavy losses.
However, the result of these attacks was that the Japanese fighters were unable to respond,to the arrival of the American dive-bombers – a fortuitous instance of coordination. In only a few minutes, in a triumph of dive bombing, three carriers were wrecked, a fourth following later once wrecked, they sunk.
These minutes shifted the arithmetic of carrier power in the Pacific. Although their aircrews mostly survived, the loss of 110 pilots was especially serious as the Japanese had stressed the value of training and had produced an elite force of aviators. The Japanese looked upon a carrier and its combat aircraft as an inseparable unit, with the aircraft as the ship’s armaments much like guns on fighting surface craft. Once lost, the pilots proved difficult to replace, not least because of a shortage of fuel for training. More seriously, the loss of four carriers’ maintenance crews could not be made up.
The Americans won decisively in the carrier battle, the Japanese losing all four of their heavy carriers present, as well as many aircraft. There was no opportunity for the Japanese to use their battleships, as the American carriers prudently retired before their approach, while the American battleships had already been sent to the West Coast.
This was one of the respects in which Midway was no Tsushima (a major naval battle fought between Russia and Japan during the Russo-Japanese War a Japanese victory). The inflexible conviction of Isoroku Yamamoto (Japanese Marshal Admiral and commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet) of the value of battleships in any battle with the Americans had served him ill. This poor judgment ensured that the Japanese had lost their large-scale offensive capacity at sea, at least as far as carriers were concerned. Conversely, the American admirals may have acted differently had they had battleships at their disposal.
American carrier strategy was in part a ‘lack-of-battleship’ strategy. The battle ensured that the Congressional elections on 3 November 1942 took place against a more benign background than if earlier in the year.
5 July 1943: Germans launch battle of Kursk
The last major German offensive on the Eastern Front sought to exploit the opportunities provided by a major German salient. They sought to break through the flanks of the salient and to achieve an encirclement triumph to match the Soviet success at Stalingrad the previous winter.
Still engaging in strategic wishful thinking, Hitler saw this as a battle of annihilation in which superior will would prevail. He hoped that victory would undermine the Allied coalition, by lessening western confidence in the likelihood of Soviet victory and increasing Soviet demands for a second front in France.
The Germans were outnumbered by the Soviets who had prepared a defence system that thwarted the German tank offensive. After heavy losses and only modest gains, Hitler cancelled the operation that had cost him much strength. Having stopped the Germans, the Soviets were now in a position to counterattack. The Germans were now to be driven back in a near-continuous process.
6 June 1944: D-Day
The Allied landings in northern France – known as D-Day – began on 6 June 1944. American, British and Canadian forces landed in Normandy, as Operation Neptune (the landings) paved the way for Operation Overlord (the invasion). Under the overall command of Eisenhower, the Allies benefited from well-organised and effective naval support for the invasion and from air superiority. In addition, a successful deception exercise, Operation Fortitude, ensured that the Normandy landing was a surprise.
The Germans had concentrated more of their defences and forces in the Calais region, which offered a shorter sea crossing and a shorter route to Germany. Normandy, in contrast, was easier to reach from the invasion ports on the south coast of England, especially Plymouth, Portland and Portsmouth. The Germans lacked adequate naval and air forces to contest an invasion, and much of their army in France was of indifferent quality, short of transport and training, and, in many cases, equipment.
German commanders were divided about where the attack was likely to fall and about how best to respond to it. They were particularly split over whether to move their ten panzer divisions close to the coast, so that the Allies could be attacked before they could consolidate their position, or to mass them as a strategic reserve. The eventual decision was for the panzer divisions, whose impact greatly worried Allied planners, to remain inland, but their ability to act as a strategic reserve was lessened by the decision not to mass them and by Allied air power. This decision reflected the tensions and uncertainties of the German command structure.
The fate of the landings was very varied. Specialised tanks developed by the British to attack coastal defences – for example, Crab flail tanks for use against minefields – proved effective in the British sector: Gold, Juno and Sword beaches. The Canadian and British forces that landed on these beaches also benefited from careful planning and preparation, from the seizure of crucial covering positions by airborne troops, and from German hesitation about how best to respond.
The situation was less happy on Omaha beach. The Americans there were inadequately prepared in the face of a good defence, not least because of poor planning and confusion in the landing, including the launching of assault craft and Duplex Drive (amphibious) Sherman tanks too far offshore, as well as a refusal to use the specialised tanks. The Americans sustained about 3,000 casualties, both in landing and on the beach, from positions on the cliffs that had not been suppressed by air attack or naval bombardment. Air power could not deliver the promised quantities of ordnance on target and on time.
Eventually the Americans were able to move inland, but, at the end of D-Day, the bridgehead was shallow and the troops in the sector were fortunate that the Germans had no armour to mount a response. This owed much to a failure in German command that reflected rigidities stemming from Hitler’s interventions.
Military writer JFC Fuller pointed out that Overlord marked a major advance in amphibious operations as there was no need to capture a port in order to land, reinforce and support the invasion force. He wrote in the Sunday Pictorial of 1 October 1944:
“had our sea power remained what it had been, solely a weapon to command the sea, the garrison Germany established in France almost certainly would have proved sufficient. It was a change in the conception of naval power which sealed the doom of that great fortress. Hitherto in all overseas invasions the invading forces had been fitted to ships. Now ships were fitted to the invading forces… how to land the invading forces in battle order… this difficulty has been overcome by building various types of special landing boats and pre-fabricated landing stages.”
To Fuller, this matched the tank in putting the defence at a disadvantage. The Dieppe operation had shown that attacking a port destroyed it thus the need to bring two prefabricated harbours composed of floating piers with the invasion. In 1944, the Germans still, mistakenly, anticipated that the Allies would focus on seizing ports.
The laying of oil pipelines under the Channel was also an impressive engineering achievement that contributed to the infrastructure of the invasion. The experience gained in earlier landings was important, although the scale of the operation and the severity of the resistance on the landing beaches were greater than in North Africa and Italy.
It proved difficult for the Allies to break out of Normandy, although they succeeded in doing so in August and were able then to advance on the German frontier. This was not a process in which amphibious operations played a role until in the autumn efforts were made to clear the Scheldt estuary. It was the same the following year. The emphasis was on advances overland and not on amphibious attacks – for example in northern Holland or north-western Germany. The situation therefore was very different to that in the Pacific.
23–26 October 1944: Battle of Leyte Gulf
The Americans used their naval and air superiority, already strong and rapidly growing, to mount a reconquest of the Philippines from October 1944. That operation helped ensure a naval battle: that of Leyte Gulf of 23–26 October, the largest naval battle of the war and one (or rather a series of engagements) that secured American maritime superiority in the western Pacific.
The availability of oil helped determine Japanese naval dispositions and, with carrier formations based in home waters and the battle force based just south of Singapore, any American movement against the Philippines presented a very serious problem for Japan. There was growing pessimism in Japan and losing honourably became a goal for at least some Japanese naval leaders. The head of the Naval Operations Section asked on 18 October 1944 that the fleet be afforded “a fitting place to die” and “the chance to bloom as flowers of death”.
With Operation Sho-Go (Victory Operation) the Japanese sought to intervene by luring the American carrier fleet away, employing their own carriers as bait, and then using two naval striking forces (under Vice-Admirals Kurita and Kiyohide respectively) to attack the vulnerable American landing fleet. This overly complex scheme posed serious problems for the ability of American admirals to read the battle and control the tempo of the battle, and, as at Midway, for their Japanese counterparts in following the plan.
In a crisis for the American operation, one of the strike forces was able to approach the landing area and was superior to the American warships. However, instead of persisting, the strike force retired its exhausted commander, Kurita, lacking knowledge of the local situation, not least due to the difficulties of identifying enemy surface ships. The net effect of the battle was the loss of four Japanese carriers, three battleships including the Musashi, 10 cruisers, other warships and many aircraft.
9 August 1945: Dropping of second atom bomb, on Nagasaki
This made more of an impact than the first bomb, dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. It now seemed likely that the Americans could mount an inexorable process of bombing. As a result, Japan agreed to surrender unconditionally. An Imperial broadcast on 15 August announced the end of hostilities. It followed Emperor Hirohito’s intervention at the Imperial Conference on 9 and 14 August.
The limited American ability to deploy more bombs speedily was not appreciated. Some 6.7 square kilometres of Nagasaki was reduced to ashes 73,884 people were killed and 74,909 injured. Long-term health consequences were calamitous.
Jeremy Black is a professor of history at the University of Exeter who specialises in British and continental European history. His publications include The Age of Total War, 1860–1945 (Praeger Publishers Inc, 2006) and World War Two: A Military History (Routledge, 2003)
This article was first published by HistoryExtra in 2016
10 September 1943 - History
ORGANISATION OF THE ROYAL NAVY 1939-1945
This is possibly a unique and certainly valuable overview of the Royal Navy in World War 2, when it accomplished so much.
It is of great help in putting all the other World War 2 material on Naval-History.Net and the internet generally into a clearer perspective
I have made a point of choosing as heading photographs, the two First Sea Lord's who served throughout the war, Admiral Pound dying in post in 1943. To me their responsibilities were beyond comprehension, and in my opinion, only those who have experienced similar roles and duties are in a position to criticise.
The Sea Lords
T he Naval Staff
Some Administrative Appointments
The Naval Staff
Orkneys & Shetlands Command
Gibraltar/North Atlantic Command, 1939-1945
Leadership, control and management of the Royal Navy was vested in the Board of Admiralty which was responsible for both the administration of the naval service and for the command of British naval operations world-wide. As such it differed from the War Office and the Air Ministry where conduct of operations was devolved to the appropriate commanders in the field.
The highest body in the Admiralty was the Board, composed of politicians, flag officers, and civil servants whose collective function was to discuss and approve major decisions on all aspects of the Royal Navy's strength. Each member of the Board had a specific function in relation to the administration of the Royal Navy.
The chairman of the Board was the First Lord of the Admiralty. A politician and member of the Cabinet, his role was to represent the navy's views in government discussion on such matters as budgets, construction programmes, manpower needs, and general maritime policy. The First Lord was assisted by a junior flag officer titled the Naval Secretary who had specific responsibility for helping the First Lord in the appointment and promotion of officers. From May 1940 onwards the First Lord, Mr A V Alexander, largely confined himself to this role and did not interfere in operational matters. This was in contrast to his immediate predecessor. Between September 1939 and May 1940, Winston Churchill, as First Lord, did take a leading role in operational matters.
The First Lord was assisted two junior politicians, the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary, and the Civil Lord. The most senior civil servant was the Permanent Secretary. The only major addition to the civilian side of the Board was the appointment of Sir James Lithgow, a prominent shipbuilder, as Controller of Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs.
Five of the six flag officers on the Board had a specific area of responsibility which was reflected in their titles
First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff
Second Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Personnel
Third Sea Lord and Controller
Fourth Sea Lord and Chief of Supplies and Transport
Fifth Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Air Services.
The other member was the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff
In September 1939, most of the members of the Board were relatively new in their posts.
The Railroad Shop Workers Strike of 1922
The Railroad Shop Workers Strike of 1922 took place from July to Oct. 1922, and included some 400,000 strikers. The walkout was touched off when the Railroad Labor Board cut wages for railroad shop workers by 7 cents. Rather than negotiate, the railroad companies replaced three-quarters of the strikers with non-union workers. U.S. Attorney General Harry Daugherty also convinced a federal judge to ban strike-related activities, leading the strikers to return to work, after they settled for a 5 cent pay cut.
Island of Elba september 1943.
Post by Jeremiah29 » 08 Jan 2008, 21:42
On September-17 1943, III./FJR.7 parachuted onto the island of Elba to capture the Italian garrison stationed there.
Did someone have informations about this operation .
Post by Peter H » 09 Jan 2008, 06:08
Post by Jeremiah29 » 09 Jan 2008, 11:10
Hi Peter H .
Thanks a lot for the link .
Post by Peter H » 10 Jan 2008, 00:04
A good link on the fortifications of Elba,from our member abaco:
It appears that elements of the 215 Coastal Division defended this stronghold.
Italian sources also mention that 116 civilians were killed in the air raid on Portoferraio on the 16th September.
Elba was also where von der Heydte(1a 2FJD) was seriously injured in an aircraft crash in September 1943.
Eduard Hübner commanded III/FJR7 at Elba:
Post by Jeremiah29 » 12 Jan 2008, 10:35
Hello Peter .
Thanks again for your help .
Do you know if III./FJR.7 had some casualties during this operation .
Post by Peter H » 13 Jan 2008, 00:25
I can't find any mention of any combat casualities at Elba so I think it was nil.
However the crash of von der Heydte's aircraft certainly caused some losses.
Total 2FJD losses in the seizure of Rome in September 1943 were 109 dead,510 wounded,including 33 killed,88 wounded at Monte Rotondo.Nil at Elba and Gran Sasso.
Post by Jeremiah29 » 13 Jan 2008, 12:57
Thanks again for all your informations .
I read somewhere that III./FJR.7 maked prisoners 10 000 italians on Elba. Can it be possible .
The father of a friend was in this batallion in 1943.
Post by Ypenburg » 14 Jan 2008, 03:51
Post by Peter H » 14 Jan 2008, 06:23
The 215th Coastal Division consisted mainly of reservists from there mid 30s onwards and these men were not motivated soldiers.
Similarly around Rome,the 2FJD(14,000 men) had the confidence to tackle,disarm something like 8 Italian divisions,say 100,000 men.
Post by Jeremiah29 » 15 Jan 2008, 10:41
Many thanks for your answers .
Post by Jeremiah29 » 06 Feb 2008, 21:26
Peter H wrote: A good link on the fortifications of Elba,from our member abaco:
It appears that elements of the 215 Coastal Division defended this stronghold.
Italian sources also mention that 116 civilians were killed in the air raid on Portoferraio on the 16th September.
Elba was also where von der Heydte(1a 2FJD) was seriously injured in an aircraft crash in September 1943.
Eduard Hübner commanded III/FJR7 at Elba:
Hi Peter .
I found an info about III./FJR.7 at Elba :
Major Hubner commanded the bataillon between Marsch and september 1943 when was replaced by Hauptmann Eberhard Schulze who commanded the III./FJR.7 until Marsch 1944.
It seem that Hauptmann Schulze commanded III./FJR.7 during the operation on Elba.
Do someone have information about this Hauptmann Schulze .
Re: Island of Elba september 1943.
Post by abaco » 21 Jan 2012, 23:47
i think that II./FJR.7 was parachuted onto the island of Elba and not III.FJR.7, and people on Elba says that many paratroopers dead because they hit the bamboo poles used in vineyards.
Re: Island of Elba september 1943.
Post by Ypenburg » 23 Jan 2012, 01:05
Airdrop on the island of Elba
September 17th 1943
The island of Elba lies a few miles off the West Coast of Italy approximately 100 miles north west of Rome.
Napoleon Bonaparte had been interred here by the British just over a century earlier and was from here that he made his military comeback to lead French forces at Waterloo.
It had no military significance except for the presence of an Italian army garrison.
An airdrop on Elba had been considered in August 1943 when SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Otto Skorzeny had been investigating the whereabouts of Mussolini.
The intelligence that Skorzeny received revealed that the Duce was being held on the island of Santa Maddalena off the North East Coast of Sardinia. When he returned from an aerial recconaisance mission over the island, he learned that Admiral Canaris, commander of Military Intelligence had persuaded Hitler and the High Command that Mussolini was being held on the island of Elba. Skorzeny received orders to prepare for an airborne assault on the island.
Skorzeny knew that his own intelligence was good and that the Duce was being held on Santa Maddalena.
It was through General Kurt Student that Skorzeny managed to get an audience with the Fuhrer and members of the High Command to try and convince them of Mussolini’s true whereabouts.
After a one hour briefing he managed to convince the listeners and the para drop on Elba was called off. As it worked out, the proposed raid on Santa Maddalena came too late as the Duce was moved to the Gran Sasso on the 28th August 1943.
As described in the Gran Sasso article on this site, Hitler ordered the preparations for 4 operations to be carried out in the event of allied landings on mainland Italy or the sudden capitulation of the new Italian government. One of these operations was Operation Schwarz (black), the military occupation of Italy and total disarming of Italian forces.
It was under this operation that an airdrop on the island of Elba was planned for September 17th 1943.
On the 10th July 1943, the allies had landed on Sicily and by the 17th August all resistance had ceased. On the 3rd September, allied forces landed on the Italian mainland, 9th September saw allied forces land at Salerno, where would the allies land next?
The garrison on Elba had been left to its own devices since the Italian capitulation on the 3rd September, what if the allies decided to assault the island? they would meet no resistance whatsoever, the Italians would lay down their arms in accordance with the surrender and the allies would have a toe hold off the west coast of Italy, miles behind the German front line.
The men chosen for the assault were from the 3rd Battalion, 7th Fallschirmjäger Regiment under the command of Major Huebner, part of the 2nd Parachute Division currently stationed in and around Rome. Men from this division were to carry out all of the airborne assaults in the Mediterranean and Aegean theatres.
Early on the 17th September Luftwaffe bombers and JU-52 transport aircraft took off from airfields outside Rome. The bombers would soften up the garrison before the paratroops jumped.
The Luftwaffe did a good job in softening up the Italians, they stayed in their foxholes throughout the raid and by the time they emerged most of the paratroops were already on the ground rounding up the dazed defenders, most of whom were glad to be taken prisoner and they put up no resistance.
The airdrop on Elba had been a complete success, but the operation had been pointless, as the allies did not decide to attack the island after all. It was at Anzio on 22nd January 1944 where the allies decided to land behind the German front line.
But Elba proved that even at this stage of the war where the odds of winning were against the Germans, they could still launch successful airborne operations.
4. USS Arizona
The USS Arizona was an American battleship built for the US Navy launched in 1915. The ship served many purposes, from escorting President Woodrow Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference to being sent to Turkey during the Greco-Turkish War, and was sent from California to Pearl Harbour, Hawaii in 1940 in response to the threat of Japanese Imperialism. On 7 December, 1941 USS Arizona was bombed by the Japanese, exploding and sinking. 1,177 crew members and officers were killed.
The shipwreck was declared a National Historic Landmark on 5 May 1989. Today the shipwreck remains and can be viewed at the USS Arizona Memorial, and is annually visited by two million people.
Battle of the Marne: 6-10 September 1914
The First Battle of the Marne marked the end of the German sweep into France and the beginning of the trench warfare that was to characterise World War One.
Germany's grand Schlieffen Plan to conquer France entailed a wheeling movement of the northern wing of its armies through central Belgium to enter France near Lille. It would turn west near the English Channel and then south to cut off the French retreat. If the plan succeeded, Germany's armies would simultaneously encircle the French Army from the north and capture Paris.
A French offensive in Lorraine prompted German counter-attacks that threw the French back onto a fortified barrier. Their defence strengthened, they could send troops to reinforce their left flank - a redistribution of strength that would prove vital in the Battle of the Marne. The German northern wing was weakened further by the removal of 11 divisions to fight in Belgium and East Prussia. The German 1st Army, under Kluck, then swung north of Paris, rather than south west, as intended. This required them to pass into the valley of the River Marne across the Paris defences, exposing them to a flank attack and a possible counter-envelopment.
On 3 September, Joffre ordered a halt to the French retreat and three days later his reinforced left flank began a general offensive. Kluck was forced to halt his advance prematurely in order to support his flank: he was still no further up the Marne Valley than Meaux.
On 9 September Bülow learned that the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was advancing into the gap between his 2nd Army and Kluck. He ordered a retreat, obliging Kluck to do the same. The counterattack of the French 5th and 6th Armies and the BEF developed into the First Battle of the Marne, a general counter-attack by the French Army. By 11 September the Germans were in full retreat.
This remarkable change in fortunes was caused partially by the exhaustion of many of the German forces: some had marched more than 240km (150 miles), fighting frequently. The German advance was also hampered by demolished bridges and railways, constricting their supply lines, and they had underestimated the resilience of the French.
The Germans withdrew northward from the Marne and made a firm defensive stand along the Lower Aisne River. Here the benefits of defence over attack became clear as the Germans repelled successive Allied attacks from the shelter of trenches: the First Battle of the Aisne marked the real beginning of trench warfare on the Western Front.
In saving Paris from capture by pushing the Germans back some 72km (45 miles), the First Battle of the Marne was a great strategic victory, as it enabled the French to continue the war. However, the Germans succeeded in capturing a large part of the industrial north east of France, a serious blow. Furthermore, the rest of 1914 bred the geographic and tactical deadlock that would take another three years and countless lives to break.